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The purpose of this research project is to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the U.S. Army’s use of reverse auctions (RAs) in regard to contracting.  RAs are 
powerful procurement tools that leverage the power of fluid market conditions through a 
dynamic pricing environment.  This project examines the use of RAs within the Army 
Contracting Command (ACC) using E. Cory Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars for 
Success. Research questions focus on identifying best practices currently used within the 
contracting field. Data gathered through personal interviews with subject matter experts 
and practitioners of RA tools identifies whether current RA platforms deliver “best 
value” procurements and generate true cost savings.  Interview questions target three key 
focus areas: personnel, platforms, and protocols.  If the ACC is to utilize RAs in the most 
effective and efficient manner, it is essential to select the appropriate RA type, field the 
best platform, and implement the correct protocols to maximize the use of RAs.  These 
three factors together will yield maximum savings while generating new process 
improvements that will enable the ACC to become a more efficient and lean organization. 
Conclusions and recommendations provide suggestions for improving the Army’s future 
use and application of RAs. 
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The use of reverse auctions (RAs) is a powerful procurement tool that continues 
to grow in size and scope. In December 2013, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) published a report titled Guidance Is Needed to Maximize Competition and 
Achieve Cost Savings, which analyzed the use of RA within four federal government 
agencies. During fiscal year (FY) 2008, the Departments of the Army, Homeland 
Security, Interior, and Veterans Affairs executed 7,193 RAs (GAO, 2013, p. 6). Only four 
short years later, that number grew to over 19,000. The GAO estimated that the total 
procurement value for RAs executed in FY2012 was more than $2 billion. The significant 
growth in the use of RA warrants future investigation to determine whether this 
innovative procurement tool is being used to its fullest potential. 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research study is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the U.S. Army’s use of reverse auctions in contracting. The data gathered through 
personal interviews with SMEs and practitioners of RA tools within the U.S. Army 
Contracting Command (ACC) will help the researchers to identify whether the use of RA 
platforms generates true cost savings. Interview questions with practitioners of RA tools 
focus on assessing effectiveness and efficiency. We define effectiveness as being 
“adequate to accomplish a purpose and producing the intended or expected result” 
(Effective, 2016). Efficiency is the ability to accomplish a task with the least waste in 
terms of time, resources, effort, and competency in performance (Efficiency, 2016). An 
analysis of interview results using E. Cory Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars for Success 
(TIPS) model identifies best practices currently used within the contracting field.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) forbids auctions or “auctioning 
techniques” for the procurement of goods and services before 1997. However, the FAR 
revisions in 1997 eliminated this language, paving the way for the use of electronic 
reverse auctions (e-RA) within the federal government (Kelman, 1999, para. 3). In 2000, 
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the Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) conducted the first RA for the 
U.S. Army. The organization purchased a secure fax machine from the General Services 
Administration (GSA) schedule, securing savings of approximately 28%. Immediately 
following the fax machine, CECOM bought two computers for a total of $3,280, 
achieving a roughly 50% savings (Murray, 2000, para. 15).  
RAs allow the buyer to have sellers compete among one another, which in return 
lowers the price. The RA model reduces price while facilitating fair and open 
competition. This process is the opposite of a conventional auction, where multiple 
buyers compete for one sale and the seller then accepts the highest bid. Typically, lowest 
price technically acceptable (LPTA) is the criteria for selecting the awardee when using 
RAs. However, RAs are also suitable for procurements utilizing trade-off procedures 
when evaluating proposals and selecting awardees. Although procurements utilizing 
trade-off evaluation criteria are not common when conducting RAs, there are several 
occasions where their use was successful.  
Established in 1999, FedBid serves as the Army’s primary source for RA services, 
although other RA platforms exist. Currently, FedBid provides services to more than 75 
federal agencies with access to a network of over 83,000 suppliers (FedBid, 2016b). 
ACC–Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) awarded contract number W91ZLK-12-P-
0699 to FedBid, Inc., on September 22, 2012, to provide an online marketplace for RAs. 
In accordance with the contract terms and conditions, FedBid is to provide training to 
users, assist with account maintenance, and provide technical and user support while 
maintaining a list of qualified suppliers. This contract is set to expire in 2017.  
Since its contract start date, FedBid has achieved more than $300 million in cost 
savings for the three organizations that compose the U.S. Army’s Contracting Command. 
The Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) has achieved savings in excess of $10 
million, and the ACC centers have realized over $44 million in savings (Z. Ennis, 
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personal communication, June 2, 2016).1 However, the Mission and Installation 
Contracting Command (MICC) is the biggest user of RA within the ACC. Command 
policy within the MICC mandates the use of RA for designated product and service 
codes. To date, the MICC has generated savings in excess of $250 million with FedBid’s 
online marketplace (Z. Ennis, personal communication, June 2, 2016).  
Recently, the GSA developed and launched its own RA platform. Established in 
2013, users of the GSA RA website have awarded over $5 million in contract awards. 
GSA’s RA platform has helped the government to achieve almost $1 million in savings, 
with an average selling price that is 14.44% lower per contract award when compared 
against the independent government cost estimate or IGCE (C. Wingate, personal 
communication, April 15, 2016).2 In addition, the Army’s Computer Hardware Enterprise 
Software Solutions (CHESS) implemented its own RA tool. However, data on its use and 
cost savings was unavailable. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our analysis identifies best practices currently used within the contracting field 
and helps to determine whether the use of RAs yields “best value” procurements and 
generates true cost savings. 
1. Primary Research Question  
 Is the Army using RAs in the most effective and efficient manner, or are 
there opportunities for expansion and/or improvement? 
 
                                                 
1 Email communication with Zach Ennis of FedBid on June 23, 2016, in the form of an Excel 
spreadsheet. The spreadsheet addressed buying agency, actions, target price, award price, savings, bidders, 
bid count averages, and small business dollars. The data included the ACC, ECC, and MICC organizations 
from January 1, 2000, through May 23, 2016. Additional information exchange conducted through ongoing 
email discussion from May 23, 2016, through October 5, 2016.  
2 Email communication with Charles Wingate from GSA on April 14, 2016.  The information 
provided tracked the Army’s use of the GSA RA tool from July 1, 2013 through February 29, 2016. The 
data package included the total IGCE amount for awarded auctions, award values, savings, percent savings 
versus the ICGE, amount of the highest bid award, savings versus highest bid, percent savings versus 
highest bid, and total highest bid by winning vendor. 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
 What theories govern the use of RA within the Army?  
 What are the current rules and regulations governing the use of RAs in the 
Army? What are the Army’s past experiences in using RAs? 
 What platforms has the Army used in the past for conducting RAs, and 
what platforms is it currently utilizing?  
 Is the Army generating the desired cost savings through its policy on the 
use of RA? 
D. SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
Multiple organizations within the federal government utilize RA platforms. This 
MBA project focuses solely on the Army’s use of RA tools. Interviewees possessed 
various levels of experience and success in their use of reverse auctioning as a 
procurement technique. The intent was to capture a snapshot of data and experiences to 
help identify procurement trends and understand how the Army employs RA tools. 
Qualitative data in the form of interview responses was the primary basis for our final 
recommendations and conclusions. Quantitative data provided by FedBid also aided in 
determining effectiveness. Recommendations offer suggestions for achieving optimal 
results using RA while also understanding any limitations or shortcomings. 
Our main objectives when conducting the interviews were to determine 
organizational processes for identifying inbound requirements as potential RA 
candidates, to identify the internal standard operating procedures (SOPs) that govern the 
use of RA, to find how agencies capture savings, and to determine the types of 
procurements that are best suited for reverse auctions. The ACC provided a list of recent 
users of RA tools, with varying levels of success in terms of generating cost savings. The 
data provided by the ACC encompassed a wide range of requirements and cost savings 
ranging from $0 to as much as $446,997 per contract action (J. Staggs, personal 
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communication, April 20, 2016).3 Identified personnel received recruitment emails, and 
those willing to participate were interviewed by telephone.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
We began our research by conducting a literature review on auction theory and 
the economic principles surrounding open markets and competition. Books, magazine 
articles, online material, and other resources were examined to understand the origins of 
auctions throughout history. More detailed research into the Army’s use of RA was 
conducted by interviewing personnel with institutional knowledge inside of the ACC. 
Information regarding the Army’s current position on the use of RA was also compiled. 
Policies, procedures, and other regulations were assessed to help understand the Army’s 
history and evolution in using this procurement technique. 
This research project also draws upon quantitative data provided by FedBid and 
the GSA. GSA provided only general data, and the researchers were unable to conduct a 
detailed analysis with the information given. However, the researchers analyzed data 
provided by FedBid by comparing target prices with award prices. The average number 
of sellers bidding compared to total bid counts also helped to determine whether the 
Army achieved adequate price competition maximizing the benefits of RAs. The 
researchers also attempted to contact the Computer Hardware Enterprise Software and 
Solutions (CHESS) for data regarding cost savings and other statistics achieved through 
their RA platform, but personnel were unresponsive.  
The primary form of data collection for this project was through personal 
interviews with SMEs and practitioners of RA platforms. The data collected was 
analyzed to determine if the Army could gain greater efficiencies by using RAs. 
Interview questions spanned the six phases of the contract management process: 
procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
                                                 
3 Communication with Jennifer Staggs, ACC procurement analyst, via ongoing email correspondence 
from April 13, 2016, to July 18, 2016. The data arrived in the form of an Excel spreadsheet, email chains, 
and a Microsoft Word file. The data and correspondence provided an in-depth understanding of how the 
ACC tracks and conducts RA. Ms. Staggs also provided a list of suggested RA users throughout the ACC 
for soliciting interviews.    
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administration, and contract closeout (Garrett, 2007, p. 20). Interview questions were also 
formatted based off E. Cory Yoder’s (2016) TIPS model and centered on personnel, 
platforms, and protocols.  
1. Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars of Success 
The TIPS model is an assessment and management tool used to identify critical 
organizational design elements. It was originally designed to support the planning and 
execution of contingency contracting operations (Yoder, 2016). An organization’s 
operational success is based on personnel, platforms, and protocols that make up the three 
pillars of success in the TIPS model. Authorization and appropriations are the foundation 
of the TIPS model. Without the proper authorization and appropriations, achieving 
organizational success is inherently more difficult. Successful organizations lie at the top 
of the TIPS Model, indicating that they have achieved the desired outcome. The TIPS 
model is a balance between analytical and conceptual approaches and is explained in 
detail during later chapters. The model has previously been used for analyzing Air Force 
green acquisitions, contingency contracting operations, and operational contract support 
(OCS) activities (Yoder, 2016).   
2. Personnel, Platforms, and Protocol  
Personnel is the first pillar that identifies the critical link between rank, position, 
credential, capability, and connection between appropriate workloads (Yoder, 2016). 
According to Yoder (2016), platforms are the second pillar that comprises the hardware 
and software structures used for “analysis, decision-making, production, management, 
and communication” within selected agencies. Protocol is the third pillar that “includes 
the rules, decision-making framework, policies, and business models” designed to attain 
organizational goals and objectives (Yoder, 2016). All three pillars work symbiotically 
with one another to form the base of the TIPS model. 
F. LIMITATIONS AND EXPECTED BENEFITS 
The project is limited in complexity, breadth, and depth due to the small 
interviewee sample size. Statistics provided by both the GSA and FedBid contained only 
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summary-level information that was cumulative from the initiation of their respective RA 
platforms. However, auctioning techniques provide a unique method for procuring goods 
and services while attaining strong price competition and realizing significant cost 
savings. The results of this project will primarily benefit the ACC by providing analysis 
and recommendations for the future use of RA.  
G. SUMMARY  
This chapter laid the groundwork for understanding the methods and techniques 
used to analyze the overall efficiency and effectiveness of RA tools. Our research focused 
on collecting data through personal interviews with contracting professionals within the 
ACC. Chapter II provides a history of auction theory and formats. Comprehending how 
markets operate is critical to understanding how RAs leverage economic principles to 
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II. AUCTION THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce auction theory and to show how it 
helps to explain buyer and seller interaction in the marketplace. Within the free market 
economy, buyers and sellers of goods and services have different desired outcomes; 
economic principles within auction theory examine buyer and seller motivation.  
B. AUCTION THEORY 
Auction theory explains how market participants behave from an economics 
perspective. The basic economic framework is important for understanding price 
elasticity and inelasticity, competition, and shifts on the supply and demand curve. 
Ultimately, the concepts presented within auction theory explain how the free market 
determines a steady state of equilibrium and efficiency. Auction theory is the building 
block for formulating a good business strategy that benefits both buyers and sellers. For 
our purposes, the buyer is the U.S. Army, and the sellers are the suppliers of goods and 
services in government acquisitions.  
C. HISTORY 
The use of auctions, as a means for selling goods and services in an organized 
marketplace, stretches back to antiquity. However, there is no record of the use of 
auctions prior to the establishment of structured societies. A marketplace with buyers and 
sellers is necessary for the employment of auctions; auctions also require a recognized 
currency that serves as a method for swiftly categorizing the value of bids. The frequency 
and popularity of auctions increased as societies and economies matured, and the need for 
acquiring and selling goods and services grew (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Shubik, & Stark, 
1983, pp. 44–45).  
The first recording of a structured auction was the annual Babylonian marriage 
market (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983, pp. 39–40). In this auction, the women of 
marrying age gathered in the village as the men surrounded them in a circle. The 
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auctioneer, known as the herald, began the bidding with the prettiest of the Babylonian 
women. The wealthiest men desiring to marry paid for the most beautiful women to 
become their wives. The men that were indifferent to beauty agreed to marry the more 
humble of Babylonian women. These men received a marriage-portion, or a stipend, in 
exchange for agreeing to marry the less desirable women. The herald used the money 
generated by the auctioning of the prettiest woman to pay the marriage-portions for the 
remaining women. 
The Roman soldiers also utilized auctions to sell the property and goods they 
attained in battle. The soldiers would gather their war trophies around a spear driven into 
the earth. The auctioneer would then sell the acquired loot to the highest bidders. The 
Roman army also executed slave auctions in this same manner. Prisoners of war from 
Roman military campaigns were sold as slaves; the revenue from these slave auctions 
helped to finance military operations (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983, p. 40). However, 
the use of auctions declined during the Middle Ages. The feudal system, small 
populations, and an ineffective monetary system made the use of auctions difficult and 
impractical. 
Beginning in the 17th century, auctions began to reemerge as a means for selling 
goods. The hammer, the hourglass, the candle, and the Dutch auction gave birth to the 
auction types commonly known today (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., 1983, p. 45). The 
hammer auction is the traditional auction type that is also known as the English auction. 
The hourglass and candle permitted bidders only a small amount of time to place bids. 
Thus, these types of auctions were more specific in scope and forced the bidder to 
possess a greater variety of auctioning skills.  The Dutch auction was a descending-bid 
auction originating in Holland but used less frequently during the beginning of the 17th 
century.  
D. BASIC TYPES OF AUCTIONS 
As auctions developed, they assumed various forms evolving into the ascending 
bid, descending bid, and sealed bid. Within each form, there are also basic auction types, 
including the English, Dutch, sealed-bid first price, sealed-bid second price (also known 
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as the Vickrey auction), and the RA (Krishna, 2010, p. 2). Each type of auction leverages 
different aspects of competitive bidding strategies to acquire or dispose of goods and 
services that facilitate the procurement process. Auctions also allow for the transfer of 
ownership from one entity to another. Selection of the appropriate auction type is critical 
to facilitating the transfer of goods and services.  
Most individuals are familiar with the traditional English auction.  The use of this 
auction type has always been to sell goods and services effectively in an expedited 
marketplace. Images of bidders with signs responding to the oral cues of the auctioneer in 
a loud and open auction arena are typical of English auctions. Bidding begins with the 
lowest price, and the action is facilitated by an auctioneer who controls the auction. One 
seller and multiple buyers compete among each other for a given item. Each individual 
bidding in the auction incrementally increases the asking price of the item with the 
winning bidder being the individual who bids the highest amount. The auction concludes 
with highest bidder winning the auctioned item as long as the final bid price is higher 
than the seller’s reserve price. If the bidder does not bid above the seller’s reserve price, 
then the sale of the auctioned item is no longer binding and the transaction is invalid 
(Gimpel, 2008, p. 167). The English auction ensures that the seller will receive a 
minimum acceptable price for a given item. Many organizations and marketplaces utilize 
this auction type, which occurs both electronically and at live events. 
The Dutch auction is counter to the English auction and utilizes a descending 
price system. Auctions begin with a starting price that exceeds the value of the item, and 
the auctioneer continues to lower the price until bids begin. This auction strategy is not 
often used because it does not facilitate the exuberant atmosphere commonly associated 
with regular auctions. Bidders watch the price gradually decrease on a price clock. 
Auction participants hit a button once the price reaches an acceptable level or a price that 
individuals are willing to pay. Regardless of its inability to generate an enthusiastic 
environment, the Dutch auction is still an effective auctioning technique.  
Sealed bidding is the next auction type. Buyers receive bids from multiple sources 
in sealed envelopes. The two types of sealed bidding are sealed-bid first price and sealed-
bid second price. In the first price scenario, auction participants place bids without the 
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knowledge of who the other participants are and their bid amounts. The winner of the 
sealed-bid goes to the individual with the highest bid.  
Economists also refer to the sealed-bid second price auction as the Vickrey 
auction (Wyld, 2000, p. 18). According to Wyld (2000), Vickrey auctions are identical to 
sealed-bid first price auctions with one exception. The final price paid by the bidder in 
the sealed-bid first price differs from the final price paid in the Vickrey auction. Sealed-
bid second price incentivizes each participant to bid closer to the “true value” of the 
auctioned item (Wyld, 2000, p. 18). Vickrey auctions assign the winning bid to pay only 
the amount equal to the next highest or second place bid. Wyld (2000) also explains that 
by bidding closest to the true value of the item, the seller receives a price that is closer to 
the value of the item being auctioned. At the same time, the winner only pays the amount 
of the next highest bidder (second place) and does not pay the winning bid amount. This 
dynamic makes the sealed-bid second price one of the most efficient auction types.  
The Yankee auction takes into account bid price, quantity, and the earliest bid 
time when determining auction winners (Wyld, 2000, p. 17). When using the Yankee 
auction, the buyer can select to purchase a partial quantity instead of the entire amount. 
This type of flexibility enables the buyer to execute multiple buys from different sellers 
for the same requirement. This aspect is unique to the Yankee auction and gives the buyer 
more options when considering the distribution of sales.  
E. REVERSE AUCTIONS 
Unlike the ascending bid auction types that serve to drive the price up, the goal of 
RAs is to drive the price down. In a traditional auction, there are one seller and numerous 
buyers. In RA, there are one buyer and multiple sellers (see Figure 1). The sellers compete 
among one other to win the contract, and the winner is the lowest bidder. Competition 
between bidders serves to drive the price down while satisfying all contractual requirements. 
Each auction is set for a predetermined amount of time, allowing for increased competition 
among a pool of qualified and vetted bidders. This type of auction is similar to the sealed-bid; 
however, bidders are aware of their place within the auction, unlike with a sealed-bid. 
Bidders know their location within the queue and whether their bid is the lowest.  
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Figure 1. Traditional Auction versus RA Comparison Analysis. 
Adapted from Kuo, Roger, & White (2000). 
As the government strives for innovative cost-cutting solutions in today’s current 
fiscal environment, one of the most successful tools for strategic procurement is the RA 
platform. With RAs, buyers, who serve in the role of the auctioneer, retain the value and 
the cost savings achieved because of this auction type (Klemperer, 2004, p. 19). Unlike 
regular auctions, the challenge in using RAs is how to gather and vet qualified sellers in a 
consolidated marketplace. The success of RAs depends on the ability of the marketplace 
to leverage competition and reduce cost. Therefore, a well-developed marketplace with 
adequate competition is fundamental to the ability of RAs to lower prices and generate 
true cost savings. 
RA platforms work in real time by having multiple sellers of goods and services 
bid down the price of the auctioned item (Hawkins, Coyne, & Hudgens, 2010, p. 3). 
Buyers determine the length of the auction, which is dependent upon the procurement 
complexity and the nature of the requirement. The winner of the RA, opposite of a 
traditional auction, is the seller who places lowest bid (Wyld, 2011a, p. 16). To achieve 
the lowest bid, sellers are able to revise their bids until the auction ends, creating a 
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dynamic pricing environment (see Figure 2). The process of RAs can create noteworthy 
savings through enhanced competition, price reduction, and significant small business 
participation (Rung, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 2.  Traditional versus Marketplace Comparison. 
Source: GAO (2013). 
The use of the RA tool creates a large-scale marketplace for sellers competing for 
both federal and private sector contracts. According to FAR Part 15.404-1(b)(2)(i), the 
government’s preference for “determining fair and reasonable price” is through “adequate 
price competition” (FAR, 2016a). Sellers are able to conduct multiple rounds of bidding 
that serve to drive prices down and strengthen competition. The drive for increased 
competition is what ultimately creates cost savings and helps to determine price 
reasonableness for users of RA tools. 
The vetting process gives an agency the ability to prescreen sellers and determine 
responsible vendors. Government agencies are also able to reserve certain types of 
contracts for socially and economically disadvantaged small business groups while still 
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achieving maximum competition. Thus, maturing and developing the RA platform, 
infrastructure, and subsequent marketplace sets the conditions to establish a well-vetted 
supplier base. Maintaining a strong supplier base is essential to amalgamate the best mix 
of quality and performance for the buyer to receive the highest quality product and 
service at the most competitive prices. In both private and public sectors, online 
marketplaces govern today’s use of RA. RA platforms also provide features that enable 
organizations to capture and view data that helps to determine true cost savings and price 
reasonableness based off of historical data. Online marketplaces also facilitate dynamic 
pricing, which is the ability to submit bids in multiple rounds of competition, allowing 
the market to establish a fair and reasonable price (Wyld, 2010, p. 24). Examples of the 
concept of dynamic pricing are given later in the chapter.   
F. MYTHS AND BIASES 
The process of reverse auctioning carries with it inherent biases and myths. Some 
of the most prevalent myths about RAs are its negative effects on the supplier base and 
that large companies with greater economies of scale benefit the most. Another common 
misconception is that the government awards contracts for commodity goods based solely 
on LPTA evaluation criteria and excludes contracts for services. Each of these biases and 
myths are nothing more than shortsighted obstacles that obscure the reality and power of 
RAs.  
1. Myth 1: RAs Damage Suppliers 
Incumbents are the main suppliers at risk from outside competition. Often the 
incumbent’s processes and systems contain inefficiencies from lack of price competition 
used to drive down costs (Wyld, 2013, p. 44). Without competition, there is less of an 
incentive to improve and streamline efficiencies. RA platforms ease barriers to entry and 
promote competition that supports new market entrants.  
2. Myth 2: Lowest Price Wins the Auction 
Buyers are not required to select sellers based solely on LPTA evaluation criteria. 
Several other factors like past performance, seller capabilities, and creditworthiness are 
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considerations when determining best value (Wyld, 2013, p. 44). It is true that price is a 
driving factor in determining the RA winner, but other factors still hold weight when 
selecting the winning seller.    
3. Myth 3: RAs Favor Large Businesses 
Small businesses have one key advantage when competing against large 
businesses. Large businesses have higher fixed costs that prevent them from competing 
against smaller business that contain specialized expertise in specific areas, which is why 
small businesses win the majority of RAs (Wyld, 2013, p. 44). To stay competitive, 
larger businesses often acquire their smaller rivals.  
4. Myth 4: RAs Are Limited to Commodity Goods and Not 
Services 
Typically, buyers use RAs when purchasing fixed priced goods and services that 
have well-defined requirements and contain a high level of specificity. Services contracts 
that contain the same characteristics, such as well-defined requirements, also serve as 
good candidates for RAs because they provide adequate competition to drive down price 
(Wyld, 2013, p. 44).  
G. ECONOMICS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND  
RAs support full and open competition, when applicable, and allow the market to 
determine winners and losers. RAs provide a platform for enabling buyers and sellers to 
achieve price equilibrium, which is one of the most basic functions observed within a free 
market economy. Understanding market behaviors is critical to discerning how RAs work 
and why they continue to increase cost savings. The strategy of each market participant 
increases the probability that outcomes are fair and reasonable, placing market 
participants in a better position than when they started. Competition increases 
efficiencies; buyers and sellers share the benefits of the cost savings achieved.  
The philosopher Fleischacker (2009) examined economist Adam Smith’s famous 
book Wealth of Nations, which brought to light the importance of the “invisible hand” 
that controls how buyers and sellers interact in open markets when determining price (p. 
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xvi). Market equilibrium occurs at the point where the supply curve intersects the demand 
curve (Mankiw, 2012, p. 77). According to Mankiw (2012), market equilibrium is the 
point where sellers are willing to sell an item and the price at which buyers are willing to 
pay for that item (see Figure 3). At this intersection, the market achieves maximum 
efficiency and contains no deadweight loss, which is the ideal market solution.  
 
 
Figure 3. Standard Supply and Demand Curve. Adapted from Mankiw (2012). 
H. PRICING STRATEGIES   
Cost-based pricing strategies allow the seller to detail expenses when establishing 
a total price for the supply of goods and services. However, one weakness of these 
strategy types is that they disregard key elements of demand that are fluid in nature, like 
price elasticity and competitive pricing (Hinterhuber & Liozu, 2012, pp. 70–71). Cost-
based strategies also carry significant up-front costs since they require sellers to develop 
a cost accounting system, which sellers utilize when estimating internal costs and 
developing prices (Garrett & Williams, 2009, p. 28).  Market-based strategies provide 
sellers with the ability to leverage market conditions and adjust prices according to 
market fluctuations. Thus, the major difference between the two strategies is that the 
cost-based approach uses fixed pricing according to the internal price structure of the 
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seller, and market-based pricing is dynamic because it changes in response to market 
conditions.   
1. Cost-Based Pricing 
Markup pricing is the new price that the seller chargers the buyer above what the 
seller originally paid when acquiring or producing the goods or services. For example, if 
a vendor purchases an item at wholesale from another source and uses that item for 
resale, or in conjunction with another product, the amount added to the original price is 
the markup price. The additional cost to the original price is the profit that the seller 
desires to generate from the sale of that particular item.  
Margin pricing is a technique used to compare the marginal benefit of the sale of 
an additional one item against the marginal cost to produce that additional item. The 
marginal cost is the direct labor and material used for manufacturing an item. Since 
rational people think at the margin, marginal pricing is a technique that aids sellers in 
their decision-making process when determining specific quantities and prices for goods 
and services based off of market demand (Mankiw, 2012, p. 285).  Margin pricing also 
enables the seller to set prices above marginal costs to expedite the sale of unwanted 
inventory.  
Rate-of-return is similar to markup pricing in determining selling price. The rate-
of-return is an objective used to determine a predetermined rate of return based off of 
initial product investments. The rate-of-return is the markup amount added to production 
costs. This pricing technique is primarily used for large-scale projects or items with high 
levels of demand to justify the capital investment. Rate-of-return pricing is effective for 
selling products like automobiles because the cost of producing one vehicle, with the 
desired rate-of-return, determines the selling price. Pricing compares total profits 
received to investments required to generate those profits. Rate-of-return pricing is also 
associated with target pricing, which takes into account the cost of producing one item 
and the amount of return generated from selling that one item.  
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2. Market-Based Pricing 
Profit maximization occurs at the point where the marginal cost intersects with the 
marginal revenue (Mankiw, 2012, p. 282).  Mankiw (2012) explains that at this 
intersection marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost achieving the highest level of 
profit maximization. Profit-maximization pricing takes into account basic market 
conditions within the economy and assumes a horizontal demand curve, as seen in Figure 
4. Sellers utilize profit-maximization pricing when market conditions are inelastic or 
when buyers are less sensitive to changes in price. The profit-maximization pricing 
technique identifies the price and quantity levels that generate the highest amount of 
profit for the seller.  
 
Figure 4. Profit Maximization Pricing. Adapted from Mankiw (2012). 
Market share lowers prices to the break-even point in an attempt to have 
competitors exit the market. Lower cost producers often utilize this pricing technique to 
drive out higher cost producers. It is a short-term strategy aimed at achieving a long-term 
solution often experienced in commodity markets. Sellers experience a temporary 
contraction of profit margins in exchange for the opportunity to gain a greater percentage 
of the market. With increased market share, sellers can raise prices after reducing 
competition to increase long-term profits. Taking an initial net loss creates barriers to 
entry and prevents new participants from entering the market.  
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Market-skimming pricing is the opposite of market-share pricing. In market 
skimming, the seller offers its goods and services at elevated prices to give the perception 
of having a superior quality. This strategy allows the seller to sell fewer goods and 
provide fewer services, but at higher prices, which facilitates higher profit margins. 
Additionally, as the sale of goods and services increases, growth rates and profit margins 
expand rapidly. Buyers believe they are receiving a better value while sellers benefit from 
the higher prices.  
Current-revenue pricing seeks to increase revenues and gain share in markets 
where buyers have a higher sensitivity to price. This technique is common when sellers 
enter new markets or launch new products. Profit margins are secondary goals behind 
increasing sales and controlling market share.  
Promotional pricing initially offers products at lower prices to target specific 
consumer groups in the hopes of changing individual buying habits. This approach 
incentivizes a customer to start doing business with a specific seller or for the seller to 
introduce a new product to the buyer. Once the buyer has accepted the promotional offer, 
the seller can increase prices in the future. 
Demand-differential pricing leverages different buyers’ valuation by raising or 
lowering prices in relation to varying demand levels. An example is airline tickets, which 
use the number of seats available and sells them to customers at different price points 
based on availability and timing. Pricing factors used to generate profits are in the best 
interest of the seller who is looking at pricing from a trade-off standpoint.  
Market competition causes sellers to jockey for position among one another in the 
form of competitive pricing to win over buyers. This happens in every market, but the 
extent is determined by product differentiation and the number of market competitors. 
Market competition places the buyer in the best position for cost savings, since each 
participant is willing to decrease prices to win over business from competitors. Market 
competition is the number one factor in achieving a fair and reasonable price from the 
buyer.  
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I. THE PRICING HIERARCHY  
Adequate price competition is the government’s preferred method for determining 
price reasonableness. Pricing environments are constantly changing in order to provide 
the right services to the correct customers in a timely manner. The government’s 
objective is to establish fair and reasonable prices regardless of whether market 
conditions are fluid or fixed. Some of the more common pricing types articulated in detail 
within this section include dynamic, sale, promotional, and fixed pricing.  
1. Dynamic 
Dynamic pricing, similar to an ascending price, uses the competitive bidding 
process where multiple sellers engage in competition with one another, driving the price 
higher. The dynamic pricing environment gives participants the ability to adjust real-time 
pricing based on other market participants’ actions providing sellers with increased 
flexibility to adapt in fluid market conditions. Similarly, RAs use a pool of qualified 
vendors to drive prices lower through a dynamic pricing environment that utilizes a 
competitive bidding process (Wyld, 2011a, p. 17). 
The four types of dynamic pricing are the auction, haggle, exchange, and bidding 
process (Wyld, 2000, p. 13). The auction is one buyer offering a contract to multiple 
sellers. This differs from the haggle, where one buyer and one seller bargain for an 
agreed price. Next, the exchange contains multiple buyers and sellers involved in 
negotiations to reach an agreed-upon price. Lastly, the bidding process involves one 
buyer with numerous sellers competing to provide a good or service (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Four Types of Dynamic Pricing. 
Source: Wyld (2000). 
Price sensitivity is the basis for dynamic pricing, which encourages substitutes for 
goods and services to enter new markets and determines how customers will react to 
changes in price. Price elasticity of demand is one measure of price sensitivity; the more 
elastic the price, the more consumers will change behaviors in response to increases or 
decreases in price (Mankiw, 2011, p. 90). This is the opposite of how price elasticity of 
demand works; changes in price only have a slight effect on demand (see Figure 6).  
A third type of elasticity, personal elasticity, allows consumers to determine the 
price they are willing to pay in a “price/value trade-off” situation (Wyld, 2000, p. 14). 
Price/value trade-offs take into account quality as well as total utility per dollar and allow 


























Figure 6. The Price Elasticity of Demand. Adapted from Mankiw (2012). 
2. Promotional  
Promotional pricing attracts buyers by offering reduced prices or promotional 
pricing for a short amount of time with the goal to decrease inventory levels. Since 
vendor prices are not set in stone and are reactive to buyer patterns, prices for items will 
fluctuate to generate additional sales or to reduce inventory levels. Promotional pricing 
helps sellers to adapt to market conditions by influencing buyer behavior through price 
manipulation.   
3. Sale 
Sale pricing, like promotional pricing, establishes a tier system for increasing 
demand by lowering prices. The seller will discount products to encourage sales after a 
product’s marketing period is over; during the initial marketing period, the product sells 
at full price. Unlike promotional pricing, sale pricing occurs incrementally. Buyers with 
lower price elasticity will purchase products at the seller’s going rate, or market price, 
whereas buyers with a higher price elasticity will not. The two buyers are both willing to 
purchase the product, but only one makes the purchase when the product is at a more 
attractive price. Therefore, the two buyers will purchase the exact same product but at 
different times and for different amounts.  
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4. Fixed 
Fixed pricing is a static pricing strategy that does not provide the buyer with a 
lower price. Pricing does not change; price levels are set, and buyers do not have the 
ability to negotiate price. Fixed pricing is much like static pricing that occurs during 
sealed bidding because it does not allow auction participants to adjust bid prices based on 
the current low bid or to view the total number of bidders (Compte & Jehiel, 2007, 
p. 355).  
J. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the framework for understanding how free markets operate 
and how economics plays a fundamental role in auction theory. It is important to 
understand how free markets operate to fully comprehend auction theory and why 
auctions are so effective.  
This chapter also introduced the concept of RAs, which possess many of the same 
qualities of other basic auction types seen throughout history. The RA platform and 
marketplace define how buyers and sellers interact in the process of acquiring goods and 
services. Chapter III continues by providing a brief history and examination of the 
Army’s use of RAs.  
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III. A HISTORY OF THE USE OF REVERSE AUCTIONS WITHIN 
THE ARMY CONTRACTING COMMAND 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter begins with an overview of the federal acquisition environment in 
the early 1990s. An understanding of the legislative initiatives and technological 
advances that occurred during this time helps to explain the evolution of the RA as an 
electronic procurement tool. This chapter also highlights current policy that governs the 
use of RAs in Army acquisitions and introduces the three most common RA types. By 
examining the ACC’s use of RAs, including the RA process and current agency practices, 
we provide a thorough analysis of cost savings. The chapter concludes with a discussion 
on the differences between cost avoidance and actual cost savings.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The mid-1990s witnessed a series of acquisition reforms aimed at increasing 
competition, streamlining the acquisition process, and adopting business best practices 
more in line with the private sector. Beginning with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
Act (FASA) in 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) in 1995, the 
government strove to maximize resources and achieve greater process efficiencies. As 
part of the FASA, the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) increased from $25,000 to 
$100,000 (Drelicharz, 1994, p. 13). Increasing the threshold was significant, for it meant 
that a larger amount of acquisitions could use simplified acquisition procedures (SAP). 
Eliminating overly burdensome regulations and redundant statutes from the contracting 
process meant significant savings for the government by lowering its costs of doing 
business (Drelicharz, 1994, p. 16). According to Drelicharz (1994), the legislation was 
the first to establish a formal commercial item definition and a preference for the 
“acquisition of commercial items to the maximum extent practicable.” By incorporating a 
broad definition into the FAR, the government strove to purchase commercial items on 
commercial terms and leverage current industry processes (Drelicharz, 1994, p. 13).  
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A lesser recognized fact is that FASA legislation also required the creation of a 
Federal Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET), which was a requirement that supported 
President Clinton’s memorandum entitled “Streamlining Procurement through Electronic 
Commerce,” issued on October 26, 1993. FACNET’s intent was to develop a paperless and 
electronic system to streamline the procurement process and encourage competition among 
small businesses (Drelicharz, 1994, p. 15).  By establishing a single point of entry, small 
businesses could receive access to small-purchase solicitations, submit their quotes, and 
receive award information, thereby reducing the administrative burden required for doing 
business with the federal government. Under FASA, federal agencies were required to install 
FACNET systems within five years (Drelicharz, 1994, p. 15).     
Ultimately, FACNET produced little success for the government, but President 
Clinton’s memorandum and FASA legislation, coupled with advances in automation and 
technology, created the catalyst for government procurement agencies to begin to alter 
their processes and methods of doing business. Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data 
Interfaces (EC/EDI) were viewed as resources to achieve greater efficiencies as the 
government began to transition to the information age and paperless transactions began.  
In 1997, changes to the FAR permitted the use of electronic commerce as the Internet 
simultaneously became more prevalent and reliable. Modifications in the government’s 
procurement processes and procedures were now needed to fully leverage new market 
technologies and competition present in the commercial marketplace. 
Matthew Meinert, director of the ACC’s Virtual Contracting Enterprise (VCE) 
suite of business tools, described the acquisition environment of the 1990s as follows: 
I would say up until 1996, we were doing everything in paper, mainframe 
computers, using MS DOS—very cumbersome tool. Then the internet, the 
web came out, and obviously back then it blew everyone away. 
Concurrently with that, Dr. Hamre [deputy secretary of defense], I believe, 
he put out a goal on the wall and said we are going to be paperless. We are 
going to have paperless contracting. Showing some leadership skills that 
“hey, the internet is here.” We know—it’s obvious where we need to go, 
let’s get there. That gave us the impetus or the top cover to go ahead and 
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starting pushing technology, e-business. (M. Meinert, personal 
communication, July 25, 2016)4 
Meinert is Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level III 
certified, holds an unlimited warrant, and possesses over 30 years of government 
contracting experience. He was also a member of CECOM’s acquisition team when the 
organization initiated the Army’s first RA in 2000.  
Edward Elgart, former director of the CECOM Acquisition Center, explained that 
CECOM became interested in the idea of RAs while attending a seminar at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Personnel learned about private industry’s 
use of RAs in MIT’s seminar on the use of the Internet as a business tool. CECOM 
officials began to conduct market research on RA software developers and formed a 
relationship with Frictionless Commerce of Cambridge, MA. CECOM arranged an 
agreement for a pilot program and RA test with Frictionless (Harris, 2001, para. 3).  
CECOM formed its own Electronic Reverse Auction Project Team (ERAPT), 
which drove the effort to test and field the RA software. After the initial test proved 
successful, CECOM purchased the RA software, linking it with the Army’s business 
webpages and making it available for use by other contracting agencies. Frictionless 
licensed its software enabling organizations to purchase the company’s license and conduct 
its own RAs via the worldwide web. Users only require 30 minutes of familiarity with the 
program before having the ability to execute their own RAs (Harris, 2001, para. 7). 
Following CECOM initial success and cost savings, the organization purchased 
additional personal computers (PCs) for performing RAs. Electronic components for the 
PATRIOT missile system achieved savings in excess of 30%. Over the next 10 auctions, 
CECOM saved a total of $2.2 million, demonstrating the effectiveness of the RA as a 
procurement tool (Harris, 2001, para. 14). In 2000, the Army executed 41 RAs; this 
number has steadily increased as the use of RAs in the federal government has grown in 
popularity (Harris, 2001, para. 14). To date, the Army has successfully awarded over 
                                                 
4 This information was communicated to us during a telephonic interview, conduct on July 25, 2016, at 
10:40 PST. 
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48,000 contracts using RAs as a procurement instrument (Z. Ennis, personal 
communication, June 23, 2016).5 
Initially, the other services, such as the Air Force and Navy, witnessed the cost 
savings and began to execute their own RAs. In a reverse auction meeting on June 26, 
2001, Lt Col Sel Snyder explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that 
the Air Force decided to collaborate with the Army on the CECOM RA tool. He 
discussed the types of commodities purchased and the savings achieved through its use 
(J. Staggs, personal communication, June 30, 2016).6 In May 2000, the Navy achieved a 
savings of over 28% during a 51-minute RA conducted through FreeMarkets, Inc., web-
based auction software. Sellers participating in the RA downloaded the company’s free 
BidWare software via CD-ROM or the Internet. FreeMarkets monitored the auction to 
assist with any issues and assessed a fee at the conclusion of the auction. Fee 
determinations were a flat percentage and assessed based on the total auction value. The 
Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) awarded a $2.37 million contract to Hi-Shear 
Technology Corporation of Torrance, CA, for 756 recovery sequencers used in aircraft 
ejection seats for the B-1, F-15, F-16, and F-117 aircraft (Murray, 2000, para.7). 
Unfortunately, the use of RAs in government procurement declined in the years 
following the success of CECOM and the other military services’ early demonstrations. 
From 2002 to 2007, agencies seemed to lose interest, and contracting officers were 
reluctant to employ RAs as a procurement instrument (M. Meinert, personal 
communication, July 25, 2016). In 2007, RAs began to build momentum again when 
FedBid collaborated with the Army under a “Proof of Concept” program. FedBid, in 
conjunction with the Army Contracting Agency (ACA), started a preliminary program at 
five U.S. Army installations. Following its opening achievement, the program expanded 
                                                 
5 This information was communicated to us via email on June 23, 2016, in the form of an Excel 
spreadsheet by FedBid. The spreadsheet addressed buying agency, actions, target price, award price, 
savings, bidders, bid count averages, and small business dollars. The data included the ACC, ECC, and 
MICC organizations from January 1, 2000, through May 23, 2016.  
6 This information was communicated to us via Microsoft Word file on June 30, 2016. The feedback 
contained background information germane to how the ACC implements policy, accounts for savings, 
SOPs for conducting RAs, interactions with FedBid, and internal platforms and protocols.  
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to five more installations (“FedBid Wins Work,” 2007). On September 15, 2009, the U.S. 
Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command (RDECOM) contracting 
center awarded FedBid a three-year contract (one base and two option years) under 
delivery order (DO) W91ZLK-09-F-0307 against GSA schedule GS-35S-0752R for RA 
services. RA services were available to all ACC agencies under this contract (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2011, para. 9). ACC-APG awarded a follow-on contract to 
FedBid for RA services on September 22, 2012, under contract number W91ZLK-12-P-
0699. Currently, FedBid is operating under option year three, and the Army has 
continued use of RA services through September 30, 2016. Next year, 2017, is the final 
option year with the contract expiring on September 30, 2017.  
The ACC published an information paper in June 2011 describing two online RA 
tools: FedBid’s online marketplace and the ACC’s VCE. VCE is a suite of tools 
developed by the ACC to assist contracting personnel in the performance of their duties. 
VCE-RA was originally designed as a pricing tool targeted for military specification 
(MILSPEC) items and other large commercial items anticipated to be awarded under 
either FAR Part 14, Sealed Bidding, or FAR Part 15, Contracting by Negotiation, 
procedures (U.S. Department of the Army, 2011, para. 14). VCE-RA is now obsolete and 
no longer in use by the ACC.  
The GSA’s Federal Technology Service (FTS) created Buyers.gov in 2001 to 
serve as a platform for e-commerce. One of three procurement tools offered on the 
website was the private auction, or GSA’s version of reverse auctioning. During that 
same year, FTS executed an RA for computers and other IT equipment for the Defense 
Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). The buy was worth approximately $10 million 
and at the time, was the biggest RA in government history (Government Executive, 2001, 
para. 2). Buyers.gov is no longer in use by the federal government, and in July 2013, the 
GSA developed and launched another RA platform to compete with FedBid. The GSA 
RA tool has accumulated significantly less volume than FedBid, which continues to serve 
as the Army’s primary source and provider for RA services. Since its inception, only 
approximately $5 million in contract awards have been procured through the GSA’s RA 
platform despite achieving savings on average of 14.4% per award (C. Wingate, personal 
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communication, April 15, 2016). Unlike FedBid, the GSA does not assess a fee for the 
use of their RA platform. Recently, the Army’s CHESS also released its own RA tool. 
However, there is limited qualitative or quantitative data available to determine the 
effectiveness and efficiency of CHESS’s platform.  
C. CURRENT POLICY  
Organizations within the ACC vary in their stance on the use of RAs. However, 
all levels of the government recognize the value of RAs as a procurement instrument due 
to its ability to achieve significant time and cost savings. Within the ACC, the MICC is 
the biggest user of RAs due to its command policy, which mandates the use of RAs in 
certain circumstances. Policies and procedures throughout all levels of the Army 
encourage the use of RAs to one degree or another. Each policy establishes RAs as viable 
means for procuring specific types of goods and services to generate higher cost savings 
due to increased competition. This section details the current policies governing the use 
of RAs. 
1. Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Procurement) Policy 
The deputy assistant secretary of the army for procurement (DASA[P]) published 
its RA policy on April 24, 2013, with the goal of establishing standard policies and 
procedures for the use of RAs within the U.S. Army. The memorandum stated, “Reverse 
auctions are best suited for simple or standardized products such as commodities or 
commodity-like products that have well-defined specifications and universally accepted 
standards” (Bass, 2013, para. 2). DASA(P) policy is to encourage the use of RAs for 
firm-fixed price (FFP) procurements under SAP for commercial items and services when 
two or more vendors are present.    
2. Mission and Installation Contracting Command Policy 
The MICC was the first command within the ACC to establish its own RA policy. 
As shown in Table 1, Command Policy Memorandum (CPM) 12-15, signed August 28, 
2012, mandates the use of RAs for procurements above the micro-purchase threshold in 
the following product codes. 
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Table 1.   Mandatory RA Product Codes per MICC CPM 12-15. 
Adapted from Vollmecke (2012). 
Product 
Code 
70 Information Technology 
71 Furniture 
58 Communication, Detection, and Coherent Radiation Equipment 
84 Clothing, Individual Equipment, and Insignia 
66 Instruments and Laboratory Equipment 
42 Fire Fighting, Rescue, and Safety Equipment 
59 Electrical and Electronic Equipment Components 
75 Office Supplies and Devices 
74 Office Machines, Text Processing Systems, and Visible Record 
Equipment 
23 Ground Effect Vehicles, Motor Vehicles, Trailers, and Cycles 
78 Recreational and Athletic Equipment 
56 Construction and Building Materials 
69 Training Aids and Devices 
39 Materials Handling Equipment 
67 Photographic Equipment 
54 Prefabricated Structures and Scaffolding 
 
MICC policy also prescribes the use of RAs to the “greatest extent practicable” 
for requirements above the “micro-purchase threshold,” but below the SAT for the 
service codes listed in Table 2 (Vollmecke, 2012, para. 3). Through an independent 
analysis of spending trends, the MICC identified these product and service codes as the 
top 20 categories to stimulate maximum competition and reduce prices, making them the 
ideal candidates for RAs. However, the MICC’s intent is not to limit or restrict the use of 
RAs to only these categories. The policy expresses a goal for the use of RAs in at least 
25% of all SAP purchases, which includes both supplies and services. 
Table 2.   Mandatory RA Service Codes per MICC CPM 12-15. 
Adapted from Vollmecke (2012). 
Service 
Codes 
S Utilities and Housekeeping Services 
V Transportation, Travel, and Relocation Services 
W Lease or Rental of Equipment 




MICC CPM 12-15 highlights two RA tools in its memorandum: FedBid’s online 
marketplace and the VCE-RA tool. It also includes language identical to the DASA(P)’s 
policy stating that RAs are best suited for simple or standardized products. MICC’s 
policy elaborates further, stating that price needs to be the primary evaluation factor in 
utilizing RAs, and use of RAs is not appropriate for complex requirements or in 
circumstances with limited competition.        
3. Army Contracting Command Policy 
After witnessing the success of the MICC’s CPM on RAs, the ACC quickly 
issued its own policy with the hopes of gaining similar cost savings. CPM 13-20, released 
on February 7, 2013, outlines the ACC’s guidance on the use of reverse auctioning and 
applies to all ACC contracting centers within the command (Nichols, 2013, para. 6). 
Unlike the MICC policy, the ACC’s policy does not mandate the use of RAs for 
identified product and service codes. The policy states that contracting officers should 
consider the use of RAs for supplies and simple services valued between $15,000 and 
$6.5 million. Policy goals include 25% use of RAs for fixed-price supplies and 
commercial services for continental United States (CONUS) buys where the estimated 
dollar amount exceeds $15,000, but is less than or equal to $150,000. For CONUS buys 
estimated between $150,000 and $6.5 million, the goal is 10% (Nichols, 2013, para. 5).    
4. Office of Federal Procurement Policy 
In 2004, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) issued a short 
memorandum entitled Utilization of Commercially Available Online Procurement 
Services (Burton, 2004). The memorandum promoted the use of online procurement 
resources in the achievement of organizational and fiscal goals. The OFPP encouraged 
agencies to leverage these valuable services to their greatest capacity and listed many 
advantages to automating the steps in the procurement process, which included achieving 
greater taxpayer savings. The OFPP specifically mentioned the use of reserve auctioning 
services as a prime example, citing the ability of RAs to enable competitive pricing 
(Burton, 2004).  
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Several years later, in June 2015, the OFPP issued another memorandum entitled 
“Effective Use of Reverse Auctions” (Rung, 2015). The OFPP provided many 
techniques, best practices, and points of consideration for contracting officers and 
specialists to employ when using RAs. The memorandum also cites the GAO’s 
December 9, 2013, report Reverse Auctions: Guidance Is Needed to Maximize 
Competition and Achieve Cost Savings. In its report, the GAO recommends that OFPP 
issue direction to its subordinate organizations for reporting cost savings information as 
well as recording other efficiencies gained by using RAs (GAO, 2013). The OFPP, 
pursuing the GAO’s recommendations, solicited the help of chief acquisition officers and 
senior procurement executives by requesting their support in recognizing and gathering 
data on RAs. The OFPP’s intent was to analyze the data to improve results seeking “to 
maximize the value of reverse auctions and ensure practices are effective and meeting 
their intended purposes” (Rung, 2015, p. 5). 
D. LEGALITIES OF RA  
Auctions became legal after the FAR re-writes in 1997 that removed specific 
language that prohibited their use. In 2004, OFPP issued guidance for all federal agencies 
to increase the use of online procurement services as a push for RAs (FedBid, 2016a, 
para. 5). Additional language added to FAR 14.202-8 grants the contracting officer 
authority to use electronic commerce for soliciting bids. In matters relating to RAs under 
10 USC 2304, Section 824 states, 
(1) single bid contracts may not be entered into resulting from reverse 
auctions unless compliant with existing Federal regulations and 
Department of Defense memoranda providing guidance on single bid 
offers; (2) all reverse auctions provide offerors with the ability to submit 
revised bids throughout the course of the auction; (3) if a reverse auction 
is conducted by a third party—(A) inherently governmental functions are 
not performed by private contractors, including by the third party; and (B) 
past performance or financial responsibility information created by the 
third party is made available to offerors; and (4) reverse auctions resulting 
in design-build military construction contracts specifically authorized in 
law are prohibited. (Levin & Mckeon, 2014, p. 149) 
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Part A of section 3 is particularly interesting and explicitly dissuades the 
delegation of “inherently governmental functions” to third parties. It is the responsibility 
of contracting officers to ensure the integrity of the procurement process when building 
solicitations, selecting appropriate vendors, and other types of administrative tasks. FAR 
Part 7.503 discusses the determination of inherently governmental functions as it 
specifically pertains to federal procurement. Under FAR 7.503(d), services in support of 
acquisition planning are not inherently governmental functions. By this description, third-
party contractors like FedBid are able to support the contracting officer during acquisition 
planning. The extent to which third-party contractors’ support contracting professionals 
depends on the terms and conditions of their contract with the government and the 
administrative procurement services requested by the contracting officer.  
FedBid, like other third-party contractors, must comply with FAR Part 9.5, which 
identifies responsibilities and rules for characterizing and evaluating organizational 
conflicts of interest. This compliance is necessary since RA tools provide services to both 
buyers and sellers, and that interaction alone can lead to conflicts of interest. Under FAR 
Part 9.504, it is the contracting officer’s responsibility to mitigate organizational conflicts 
of interest before contract award. Both the contracting office and the FedBid personnel 
must work together to ensure the integrity of the procurement process.  
In 2005, the MTB Group, Inc., protested an online auction on grounds of price 
disclosure during the auction. The GAO denied the protest issuing the following decision:  
Protest that conducting procurement using reverse auction format is 
impermissible because vendors’ prices will be disclosed during the auction 
is denied; agency is conducting reverse auction under simplified 
acquisition procedures, which encourage use of innovative procedures and 
do not expressly prohibit disclosure of vendors’ prices in implementing 
such procedures, and disclosure is not prohibited under the procurement 
integrity provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act. 
(GAO, 2005, p. 1) 
The Court of Federal Claims under MTB Group, Inc. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 516, 
523-24, determined that the use of reverse auctions is a legal procurement method and 
found MTB’s protest without merit. RAs enable transparency through public competition 
and each bidder, while anonymous, is able to determine if it has the lowest bid. MTB also 
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brought light to the issue of market competitors being able to derive what each vendor 
submitted and use that information in future auctions (GAO, 2005, p. 4). The courts 
decided that this disclosure of information is no different from what occurs in a sealed 
bid where all offerors can view the winning bid amount. Transparency with respect to bid 
ranking during online auctions is what helps to prevent fraud, corruption, and collusion.  
E. THE REVERSE AUCTION TYPES  
The government’s selection of the appropriate RA platform is an important 
decision when trying to maximize efficiencies and achieve true cost savings. David C. 
Wyld, founder and director of the Reverse Auction Research Center, published a 
comparison of the reverse auction models, available for use by the public sector. The 
three models are fully managed RA marketplaces, self-service reverse auctions, and 
event-based software reverse auctions (Wyld, 2014). Each RA type varies in its 
characteristics and business model description providing varying levels of service, market 
parameters, and customer support.  
With marketplace management come increased costs for the service providers. 
According to Wyld (2011b), RA service providers utilize four business models. First, 
winning sellers pay a variable transaction fee based on a percentage of the winning 
amount. Second, buyers pay the transaction fee determined using the same methodology. 
Fees are variable; they are a percentage of the winning bid amount. Under these first two 
models, RA service providers provide market research assistance, design the software, 
provide training, and execute the RA events (Wyld, 2011b, p. 11). Next, buyers purchase 
a license under the software-only option. After obtaining the license, buyers structure and 
execute their own RAs. Consequently, buyers are responsible for training sellers on the 
use of the platform. Finally, buyers can outsource to an RA service provider for a fixed 
price. The fixed price amount enables buyers to use service providers and conduct RAs 
for an established period. Like the first two business models, service providers assist with 
the market research, training, and execution of events (Wyld, 2011a, p. 11).  
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1. Fully Managed RA Marketplaces 
Fully managed RA marketplaces are marketplaces that provide a complete suite 
of services from marketplace maintenance to training and full-service customer and 
technical support. Fully managed RA marketplaces are available globally through the 
Internet and enabled by online marketplaces; no software installation is required. Wyld 
(2014) described the seller community as robust and active with automated email 
notifications alerting potential sellers of online requirement postings. The recommended 
size for acquisitions utilizing a fully managed RA marketplace is $3,000 to $500,000 
with procurement types including commodities and simple services that vary in size and 
dollar amount (Wyld, 2014, p. 1). Interfaces are user friendly with customer support 
available from auction initiation through closure.    
2. Event-Based Software RA  
The event-based software RA is a tool that contains only the platform for 
conducting the RA bidding process. Any specific support services require additional cost 
and are priced higher when needed. The buyer uses the platform to conduct the RA and 
pays only for the additional services that it requires. This allows the buyer to tailor each 
RA event based on specific market research that establishes specific suppliers who are 
able to compete, which creates a smaller marketplace. Marketplaces are limited to a 
selected pool of potential sellers; buyers notify vendors for auction participation via 
email. Procurements are for larger commodity buys and may consist of manufactured 
items where multiple awards for blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) and indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) classify the contract type (Wyld, 2014, p. 2). 
3. Self-Service RA  
Self-service RAs provide fewer amenities than their counterpart types and require 
software installation; however, additional services may be available for purchase and 
include consulting support. Service levels vary depending on the characteristics of the 
auction, and costs increase with the need for additional services (Wyld, 2014, p. 3). 
Transaction fees are typically per RA event or are a flat percentage fee determined by the 
contract award amount. Like event-based software RA auctions, requirements are 
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generally larger commodity buys and manufactured procurements in excess of $500,000. 
The acquisition process is lengthy since the buyer must determine the auction scope and 
provide sellers with training. During auction execution, sellers view pricing among their 
competitors; auction extensions risk excess pricing pressure creating anxiety and 
potential default risks for sellers (Wyld, 2014, p. 3).   
F. MARKET RESEARCH 
The acquisition process begins when contracting officers receive a complete 
requirements package, which signals the beginning of the procurement acquisition lead 
time (PALT). Contracting officers begin by collecting data to determine the capabilities 
of the marketplace. Market research validates requirements and serves to establish a 
comprehensive procurement strategy, and it is the single most important aspect for 
developing sensible business judgment and implementing a sound acquisition approach. 
Market research defines requirements, manages risk, and ultimately promotes market 
competition and changes based on the complexity of the requirement. Thorough market 
research gives the buyer the ability to understand current market conditions, to discover 
alternative solutions to requirements, and to gain insight into price expectations (Mission 
and Installation Contracting Command [MICC], 2012). Every procurement must take into 
account market conditions, which can have the greatest impact in determining a fair and 
reasonable price.  
Typically, a fair and reasonable price for buyers means not paying above the 
standard market value. The buyer seeks to determine current market rates partly set by 
what other market participants, or other buyers, are willing to pay for similar goods and 
services. Determining what others are willing to pay takes both good market research and 
a certain reliance on historical data. For sellers, a fair and reasonable price typically 
means achieving the highest price that the market is willing to pay. Costs are the 
expenses incurred for a seller to make a good or provide a service. The costs, plus the 
profit or compensation that the seller expects to receive, usually result in the vendor’s 
selling price. Both the buyer and seller have different strategies that they can employ to 
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achieve their desired outcomes. The dilemma is bringing the buyer and the seller together 
at an agreed-upon price that satisfies both side’s needs.  
Historical data analysis gives the buyer the ability to see what others have paid for 
similar goods and services in the past and provides another venue for determining price 
estimates and general price ranges. Historical data analysis, coupled with market 
research, gives the buyer a good understanding of the current market conditions and a 
solid foundation to develop a well-crafted procurement plan. From the results of market 
research, contracting officers develop their acquisition strategy, which includes choosing 
a solicitation technique for procuring goods and services from an approved source that is 
at a fair and reasonable price. The most accepted method for the government when 
determining price reasonableness is through price competition.  
Results of market research also influence socioeconomic set-aside requirements 
and determinations. The small business reservation includes commercial item 
procurements that are above the micro-purchase threshold of $3,000, but below the SAT 
of $150,000. Under FAR 19.502-2, contracting officers utilize the small business 
reservation when there are “two or more small business concerns” that are able to satisfy 
the acquisition (FAR, 2012c). If a procurement is set aside for a particular socioeconomic 
class, contracting officers and specialists will only solicit those vendors within that 
category.  For example, if a requirement is set-aside for small business, then vendors 
classified as large businesses may not participate in the bidding process. Upon 
completion of market research and the acquisition strategy, contracting officers will have 
determined if a socioeconomic set-aside applies. Otherwise, contracting officers will 
utilize procedures that encompass “full and open competition” under FAR subpart 6.1 
that includes large businesses (FAR, 2016b).  
G. THE RA PROCESS 
Contracting officers set the terms for the procurement and decide the parameters 
governing the RA. These parameters include the auction length, item descriptions and 
quantity, delivery dates or periods of performance, vendor qualifications, set-aside 
requirements, and other terms and conditions. Contracting officers also enter a target 
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price that serves as an anchor and the government’s reservation price. Upon the 
conclusion of the RA, the contracting officer may elect to end the auction by selecting the 
winning seller, or the contracting officer may extend the auction length if there are no 
bids. Contracting officers may also choose to re-procure the requirement using full and 
open competition if not enough responses were returned when using set-aside restrictions. 
RAs are anonymous, meaning the seller identification is generic. Buyers are able to view 
the identity of sellers competing, but participants in the RA only know their place in the 
auction. For FedBid, sellers see their bids labeled either “LEAD” or “LAG.” Upon 
conclusion of the RA, sellers may view the winning bidder’s identification and bid price 
(FedBid, 2016b).  
1. Buyer Benefits 
For simple supplies and services, market research often reveals RAs as an 
appropriate solicitation tool and a potential procurement instrument for maximizing 
competition and generating cost savings. Online RAs benefit buyers through the 
knowledge that they are receiving real-time market pricing from approved sources of 
supply (Wyld, 2011a, p. 16). RAs create a “dynamic” pricing environment. This means 
that sellers interact through competitive bidding to drive the price down until the true 
market price is achieved (Wyld, 2011a, p. 17). Sellers engage in multiple rounds of bid 
submissions designed to generate cost savings. Thus, for buyers, the importance of 
effective competition is of the upmost importance since this is the primary means for 
achieving hard cost savings. As Wheaton (2010) explains in his informative synopsis of 
government RAs,  
As long as the government buyer has a pool of qualified suppliers that are 
willing to participate in a reverse auction, the power of competitive 
bidding and price disclosure will drive the price lower. It is important to 
remember, that in a reverse auction, it is the power of the market and 
competitive bidding, not the buyer bullying the vendor that drives the 
pricing lower. Vendors then respond to these market price signals and 
adjust their pricing accordingly. 
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2. Seller Benefits 
Reverse auctioning is effective because it can serve to benefit both buyers and 
sellers by providing a consolidated marketplace that is both easily accessible and user 
friendly. While buyers benefit through efficiencies gained by competition, sellers also 
profit by providing prices that are most advantageous to their situation. For example, a 
vendor might be holding excess inventory on their books, resulting in increased carrying 
costs. By offering competitive pricing in an RA scenario, a seller could propose lower bid 
prices that would benefit their bottom line by reducing operating expenses (Wyld, 2011a, 
p. 17). In addition, RAs also benefit vendors by reducing administrative burdens that 
occur when companies prepare and submit bids. Greater process efficiencies serve as an 
advantage for both sides, especially sellers that are small businesses and that might not 
otherwise have robust resources that both government and large businesses employ.     
H. FEDBID, INC. 
FedBid provides a fully managed RA marketplace, meaning that the company 
delivers the full suite of RA services. In accordance with contract W91ZLK-12-P-0699, 
P00002, this includes the following list of reverse auctioning services: 
 Train acquisition users. 
 Set up accounts for acquisition users. 
 Provide technical/user support (help desk) to troubleshoot problems with 
the system. 
 Provide a qualified list of suppliers. 
 Recruit and train new sellers to expand the supplier pool. 
 Allow the Army to provide suggested sources. 
 Notify vendors of any new postings. 
 Allow suppliers/bidders to bid down prices and submit multiple bids. 
 Hide the identity of bidders, so bidder information is anonymous to each 
other. 
 Serve as a proxy to post and cancel bids when necessary. 
 41
 Provide expert reverse auctioning advice when necessary (i.e., timeframe 
of bids, cancellations and reposting of bids, etc.) 
 Provide a summary of all bids submitted per event. 
 Provide details of each bid submitted per event. 
 Provide vendor specific information (i.e., company name, address, point of 
contact, POC phone numbers and e-mail addresses, company’s tax 
identification number, company’s Data Universal Numbering System 
[DUNS] number, Cage Code, etc.) 
 Enable buyers to utilize existing Multiple-Award Contract (MACs) or 
Government-Wide-Acquisition Contracts (GWACs) with the system. 
 Create and maintain solid relationships with the ACC user community 
(Buyers and Sellers). (U.S. Department of the Army, 2012, pp. 5–6) 
When the buyer conducts an RA through FedBid’s online marketplace, the 
contracting officer or specialist enters a target price provided by the requiring activity. 
IGCEs most commonly serve as the basis for establishing target prices. Market research 
and catalog pricing is a technique for determining target prices when IGCEs are not 
required. Comparisons between the final award price and the initial target price are the 
basis for determining savings; inaccurate IGCEs or target prices can provide a 
misrepresentation or inflation of cost savings. Many critics question the methodology for 
calculating cost savings since IGCEs and target prices serve as only cost estimates.  
FedBid follows a business model that assesses no more than a 3% variable 
transaction fee per contract action; the fee caps at $10,000 per transaction based off the 
lowest bid received. FedBid adds this transaction fee to the winning seller’s final price, so 
it is essentially a pass-through cost paid by the government. Upon completion of contract 
performance, FedBid bills the winning vendor, and the contractor then pays the fee (see 
Figure 7). Additionally, within FedBid, there is the option to set aside requirements 
specifically for GSA schedule holders. Agencies that solicit and award requirements 
through the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) essentially pay a double fee. GSA schedule 
holders assess a 0.75% fee based on the total sale price, known as the Industrial Funding 
Fee (IFF). When awards are made through FedBid to FSS holders, the government pays a 
double fee that includes the IFF and FedBid’s fee.  
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Figure 7. FedBid’s Process for Assessing Fees. 
Source: FedBid (2016b). 
If the final price exceeds the initial target price, the contracting officer or 
specialist may request that FedBid remove its fee. Per the Performance Work Statement 
included in contract W91ZLK-12-P-0699, P0002,  
FedBid reserves the right to adjust its fee downward to address situations 
in which the buyer has met its competition and other procurement goals 
through FedBid, but the fee has caused the selected vendor’s bid to exceed 
a target price based on an actual market research quote or official 
published contract price. In such cases, FedBid shall reduce or remove its 
fee so that the awarded price will not exceed the target price. (U.S. 
Department of the Army, 2012, p. 5) 
Fee removal is not automatic, and the government will absorb the additional 3% cost in 
the final price paid when the fee is not waived. 
I. COST SAVINGS ANALYSIS 
In July 2012, David C. Wyld, professor of management at Southeastern Louisiana 
University, published a report that analyzed the ACC’s cost savings using RAs. To 
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calculate savings, while mitigating the impact of inaccurate target prices, Wyld applied 
three screening criteria to the ACC’s FY2011 RA buys. He removed any awards that 
were (1) made with inactive or no established target prices, (2) made with inflated target 
prices, as evident by cost savings greater than 50%, and (3) made with target prices set 
too low, ending with negative cost savings or prices above the target price (Wyld, 2012, 
p. 10). The purpose of the screening criteria was to remove any erratic data resulting from 
poor market research and reflected in skewed target prices. 
Wyld (2012) concluded that most of the ACC’s RA buys had valid target prices; 
however, Wyld eliminated 17.8% of RA buys since they satisfied one of the three 
criteria. For FY2011, Wyld screened 4,786 buys, and 3,933 were valid representing 
88.5% of all dollars obligated and 82.2% of contract awards. Overall, savings averaged 
11.5% per contract action for FY2011. Wyld (2012) also performed a similar screening 
and analysis for FY2007–FY2011. For these years, savings averaged 9.9% for 19,240 
contract awards. Savings percentages for unscreened RA buys were higher for both 
categories. For FY2007–FY2011, savings for unscreened buys were 13.7% vice 9.9% for 
screened buys; for FY2011, savings were 14.3% for unscreened buys and 11.5% for 
screened buys. Wyld (2012) attempted to eliminate any skepticism in regard to inaccurate 
IGCEs or target prices. He ended his report by concluding that the critics were wrong and 
that he believed that RAs present an opportunity to generate substantial cost savings.  
1. Hard Savings  
Data provided by FedBid, since the inception of the platform, reveals cost savings 
consistent with the findings in Wyld’s report. From January 1, 2000, to May 23, 2016, 
RA buys conducted by the ACC through FedBid’s online marketplace received an 
average savings of 10.97% (Z. Ennis, personal communication, June 2, 2016). These 
findings present solid documentation and supporting evidence that the government can 
realize significant savings with RAs. Unlike Wyld’s report, these numbers only compare 
target prices to award prices and do not consider flawed or inflated IGCEs and target 
prices. To gain greater clarity on true cost savings, it is important to analyze the data in 
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relation to the fees assessed by FedBid for the use of their platform and online 
marketplace. 
From August 8, 2015, through February 19, 2016, the ACC completed 368 RAs 
using the FedBid’s RA platform. Of those 368 RAs, 255 were open market buys, 72 were 
CHESS buys, and 39 were from the GSA schedule holders. Open market buys 
represented almost 70% of total auctions. The average percent savings was 9%, ranging 
from 0–49.3% with an average dollar savings of $5,461. Over a third (37%) of the total 
RAs conducted by the ACC had no reported cost savings, and 46% had no costs savings 
over $12 (J. Staggs, personal communication, April 19, 2016). When fees exceed target 
prices, FedBid waives its fee at the request of the contracting officer. When analyzing the 
data presented in this section, it appears that FedBid applied fees on buys that achieved 
zero cost savings and only waived fees to an extent not to exceed target prices. To 
determine true cost savings, it is necessary to subtract the fee amount from the total cost 
savings generated to determine realized cost savings.  
More than 50%, or 193 of the total 368 RAs conducted during the 28-week 
period, generated a realized cost savings, ranging from zero to negative $10,000. Of the 
remaining 175 RAs, the average savings was $10,466 and ranged from zero to $437,110. 
Additionally, of the total 368 RAs conducted, 150 auctions (40%) did not produce cost 
savings, and FedBid charged the government a fee that resulted in negative cost savings 
to the government. For all buys, the realized cost savings totaled $1,655,393, and this 
new savings amount is significantly less than the $2,009,750 reported by FedBid for the 
same period (J. Staggs, personal communication, April 19, 2016). The large discrepancy 
is a result of the way that realized savings are calculated. The reported savings by FedBid 
takes the difference in the target price from the final price paid. It does not take the total 
savings and subtract the actual charged fee. More than half the time in our sample, the 
difference between savings minus fees resulted in no cost savings for the use of RAs.   
2. Soft Savings 
Dollars saved is not the only form of savings; there are soft savings as well. The 
RA platform generates efficiencies for an undermanned and over-utilized contracting 
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workforce. During particularly hectic times, such as the end of the fiscal year, RAs 
provide a valuable service to contracting officers and specialists seeking to make contract 
awards in an expeditious fashion. Lowering PALT times means that acquisition 
professionals can rededicate their time to other tasks. Online RAs and e-commerce also 
provide savings to organizations by improving processes when awarding contracts. The 
MICC concludes  
that the use of RA not only results in contract savings, but it also reduces 
touch labor for MICC contract specialists. MICC specialists save on 
average approximately five hours on touch labor per action because RA 
minimizes market research needs and small business determinations. (J. 
Staggs, personal communication, July 1, 2016)7   
Having an established online platform along with a vetted customer base saves 
time during each new solicitation and requires less time from contracting personnel who 
no longer need to contact vendors individually. Online platforms give the contracting 
officer the ability to clone specific buys by keeping all relevant data the same and 
leveraging speed to issue new solicitations. This results in time savings during each new 
post for similar or like items and services while still giving the contracting office the 
ability to tailor each new solicitation to meet customer requirements. These efficiencies 
in the procurement process continue to pay dividends for each new auction since the 
framework is already in place and the upfront costs are paid. New efficiencies also give 
commanders the opportunity to repurpose unspent funds and time to achieve other 
command priorities and objectives. Soft savings provide unit commanders with the 
flexibility to manage priorities and create a more efficient contracting workforce.     
J. COST SAVINGS VERSUS COST AVOIDANCE 
When discussing the use of RAs, it is important to distinguish between true cost 
savings and cost avoidance (M. Meinert, personal communication, July 25, 2016). Cost 
savings uses historical pricing, which contains the actual price paid by buyers for 
previous procurements. Past pricing sets a baseline for costs, and any reduction from that 
                                                 
7 This information was communicated to us via email correspondence on July 1, 2016, in response to 
interview questions discussing the background information pertinent to ACC.      
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established anchor is cost savings. Buyers return the savings to the customer for 
reprogramming to other areas. Cost avoidance occurs when an item is selling for retail 
and the RA process drives the original selling price lower. With cost avoidance, there are 
no realized savings; there is only the difference between the final selling price and the 
pre-established retail price. The reprogramming of the cost savings fails to occur. The 
buyer simply reduces the amount allocated for the purchase of that item, constituting cost 
avoidance.  
Sustained cost savings also occurs when the buyer continues to generate reduced 
pricing from repeated purchases. For example, if a buyer purchases computer paper and 
is able to pay less than 25% of the asking price, the buyer has reduced costs. The 25% 
reduction in price is cost avoidance. However, if the 25% reduction in price is generated 
from a previous buy, then that reduction is classified as cost savings. The two terms have 
different applications and when used interchangeably, misrepresent actual savings (Wyld, 
2011a, p. 16).  
K. SUMMARY 
This chapter summarized the history of the acquisition environment that led to the 
development of RAs as an online procurement tool. The chapter also included a 
discussion of the history of RAs within the ACC, current policies governing the use of 
RAs, the three primary RA types, a cost savings analysis, and the differences between 
true cost savings and simply cost avoidance. The next chapter continues with an analysis 
of personnel, platforms, and protocols.     
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IV. EXAMINATION OF THE USE OF RA WITHIN ACC 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the ACC’s use of personnel, platforms, 
and protocols using E. Cory Yoder’s Three Integrative Pillars of Success (TIPS) model. 
This chapter also helps to identify whether the Army is using RAs in the most effective 
and efficient manner to realize true cost savings. The basis for this analysis is from 
personal interviews conducted with SMEs and practitioners of RAs within ACC. The 
researchers also analyzed current policy to recognize protocol differences and their 
effects on RAs. 
B. MODEL 
The TIPS model is well known and a commonly utilized management tool that 
characterizes key organizational design elements. E. Cory Yoder established the model as 
an “assessment and management tool for planning and executing contingency contracting 
operations” (Yoder, 2016). Since its development, the TIPS model has been employed by 
various entities including the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (E. Cory Yoder, personal communication, October 27, 2016).8 The TIPS 
model is such a successful tool because it can be applied in multiple capacities and 
provides the framework for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of an 
organization.  
The Gansler Commission also utilized the Three Tier Model (TTM), the precursor 
of the TIPS model, when discussing personnel in its 2007 report, Urgent Reform Needed: 
Army Expeditionary Contracting (Gansler et al., 2007). The commission provided several 
key findings specific to personnel, platforms, and protocols. The Gansler Commission 
identified personnel shortages as not having enough people in the right positions with the 
proper training to accomplish the mission. Platforms for contracting support functions 
and tasks were also inadequate in facilitating contracting and management operations. 
                                                 
8 Conversation with E. Cory Yoder on October 27, 2016. Professor Yoder debriefed the Commission 
on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan on the TIPS model on May 4-5, 2011. 
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Lastly, existing protocols failed to provide the necessary legislative and regulatory 
changes needed to give the right people, in the right positions, the required authority to 
accomplish their assigned missions (Gansler et al., 2007, pp. 47–57). 
 
Figure 8. E. Cory Yoder’s TIPS Model. Source: Yoder (2016). 
Every organization’s operational success depends upon its ability to properly 
manage and use its personnel, platforms, and protocols, which represent the three 
freestanding pillars in the TIPS model. In 2013, the model received an update that 
included the addition of authorization and appropriation as the base of the model. 
Without the proper funding, it is impossible to structure any activities, execute any 
function, or even hire personnel, which are all essential elements to an organization’s 
existence. Therefore, authorization and appropriation symbolize the foundation upon 
which all future elements are built. Successful organization stands at the top of the model 
signifying optimization or the complete and successful integration of the three pillars into 
an organization’s daily operations and processes. 
The TIPS model is such an effective assessment tool because it helps to identify 
both organizational weaknesses and best practices. By identifying areas for improvement, 
the TIPS model serves as a guide for leadership by helping to focus their efforts on areas 
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that require additional emphasis. Assessment results also help in the achievement of 
process improvement and efficiencies for enhancing information sharing (Yoder, 2016). 
By identifying best practices, the TIPS model helps organizations to recognize areas for 
sustainment where internal processes are effective. The sharing of lessons learned and 
best practices also assists other units seeking to implement improved business processes.  
1. Personnel 
Personnel is the first pillar, and it identifies the critical link between rank, 
position, credential, capability, and appropriate workloads (Yoder, 2016). Ultimately, the 
personnel pillar is about having the right people, in the right positions, and with the 
proper authority. Education, functional training, certifications, and experience are all 
essential factors to cultivating and maintaining a well-credentialed and effective 
workforce. Furthermore, each of these components addresses a critical aspect necessary 
for developing a professional career field that is capable of performing in complex 
organizations and in a highly technical function like federal contracting.  
The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) classifies the contracting series as 
1102 with the following definition: 
This series includes positions that manage, supervise, perform, or develop 
policies and procedures for professional work involving the procurement 
of supplies, services, construction, or research and development using 
formal advertising or negotiation procedures; the evaluation of contract 
price proposals; and the administration or termination and close out of 
contracts. The work requires knowledge of the legislation, regulations, and 
methods used in contracting; and knowledge of business and industry 
practices, sources of supply, cost factors, and requirements characteristics. 
(U.S. Office of Personnel Management [OPM], 1983) 
Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) 51C is the designation for uniformed 
contracting personnel within the Army and includes both commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers. Regardless of rank, position, grade, military, or civilian, only 
properly warranted contracting officers maintain the authority to legally bind the 
government. The requirements and process for warranting contracting personnel vary 
across commands and organizations. Evaluating personnel as potential warranted 
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contracting officers means identifying the right mix of training, education, and 
experience. Leaders must also strategically place individuals in positions that enable them 
to have the most significant impact within the organization. Properly structuring and 
empowering personnel helps to integrate the three pillars of success and is essential to 
maintaining a highly effective unit.  
a. Training and Education 
The contracting series is a professional career field that places a high value on 
both education and training. Formal education includes higher degrees obtained from 
accredited colleges and universities. Education aids in the development of critical 
thinking skills for higher-level management functions that include tasks such as the 
development of policy. The contracting career field places a special emphasis on 
obtaining business credit hours, which is a requirement for certification (see Figures 9, 
10, and 11). Education also includes Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and 
other military courses required for promotion within the officer and noncommissioned 
officer ranks. Training focuses on the practical application of skills necessary to perform 
a task or specific function. Training primarily refers to functional training offered through 
the Defense Acquisition University (DAU), but other forms of training may include 
briefings, exercises, conferences, and other events hosted by both external agencies or by 
groups internal to the organization.  
b. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
Certification Levels 
Defense acquisition workforce groups contain experienced personnel who possess 
accreditations under DAWIA that are internal requirements to the Department of Defense 
(DOD). DAWIA certifications are only available to DOD military and civilians assigned 
to acquisition coded positions (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2016). The DAU 
offers certifications in the following career fields: Auditing; Business—Cost Estimating 
(CE); Business—Financial Management (FM); Contracting; Engineering; Facilities 
Engineering; Industrial/Contract Property Management; Information Technology (IT); 
Life Cycle Logistics; Program Management (PM); Production, Quality, and 
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Manufacturing (PQM); Purchasing, Science and Technology Manager; and Test and 
Evaluation (DAU, 2016). There are three DAWIA certification levels within each career 
field, and obtaining each level requires functional training, job experience, and education 
to satisfy DAWIA requirements. Both civilian and military personnel need to achieve the 
proper credentials to serve in the contracting career field, but certification is not a 
qualification requirement for employment (DAU, 2010). Again, DAWIA certifications 
are internal to DOD personnel only. For example, contracting certifications obtained with 
outside agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) are non-transferable, 
and DAWIA requirements are non-waivable (DAU, 2016).  
 
Figure 9. DAWIA Level I Certification Standards. Source: DAU (2016). 
 
Figure 10. DAWIA Level II Certification Standards. Source: DAU (2016). 
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Figure 11. DAWIA Level III Certification Standards. Source: DAU (2016). 
The Career Acquisition Personnel and Position Management Information System 
(CAPPMIS) serves as the system that manages the DAWIA certification process for 
Army military and civilian contracting personnel. Accessed through the Career 
Acquisition Management Portal (CAMP), CAPPMIS also tracks all individual 
educational and functional training, providing an Acquisition Record Brief (ARB) for 
both Army military and civilian contracting personnel. Certifications for acquisition-
coded personnel do not expire, and DAWIA encourages workforce members to obtain 
certifications in multiple career fields (DAU, 2010).  
c. Experience 
Experience is a valuable intangible asset and an important component of the 
personnel pillar under the TIPS model. There are two categories of experience, which are 
general and specialized (DAU, 2015). DOD contracting is a very technical career field 
that requires contracting-specific experience. DAWIA certification requirements assess 
and measure experience in terms of years and months (DAU, 2015). In addition, the 
certification process enables contracting personnel to exchange education for experience. 
For example, DAWIA applies an education credit to substitute for a year of experience 
when applying for certifications. Unfortunately, multiple degrees do not equate to 
multiple credits for additional years of experience (DAU, 2015). It is possible to gain 
creditable DOD acquisition experience from a number of sources including designated 
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and non-designated DOD positions, other government agencies, and private industry 
(DAU, 2015).  
2. Platforms 
Platforms are the second pillar that comprise the hardware and software structures 
used for analysis, decision-making, production, management, and communication within 
selected agencies (Yoder, 2016). The platform pillar works in unison with the other two 
pillars, and each relies on the others to operate effectively. For example, the 
organization’s personnel utilize platforms dictated by the organization’s protocols to 
execute operations and conduct daily business.  
Many of the platforms used in the contracting career field serve as the internal 
systems that document each stage of the contract management process from procurement 
planning to contract closeout. These platforms manage and track customer requirements, 
document market research, support the creation of solicitations, and generate the final 
contract for award including all contract terms, conditions, and clauses. The standard 
procurement system (SPS), also referred to as procurement desktop defense (PD2), is an 
internal platform and is the current contract writing system that the Army uses to solicit, 
award, and close out contracts.  
Online databases and web-based platforms also support varying phases of the 
contract management process. For RAs, the Army currently utilizes three main platforms: 
FedBid, GSA, and CHESS. All RA platforms are web-based and external to the 
organization, with the primary platform being the fully managed marketplace offered by 
FedBid. The three RA types, mentioned in Chapter III, include the fully managed RA 
marketplace, the event-based software RA, and the self-service RA. Each of these RA 
marketplaces offer varying levels of service and support based on the customer’s needs 
and the organization’s goals and objectives. Determining what type of platform and 
service level to use depends on several factors that include the procurement type, agency 
procedures, and other requirement specifications.  
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3. Protocols 
The third pillar, protocols, is made of organizational rules and guidelines, 
decision-making frameworks, policies, and business models tailored to attain specific 
goals and objectives (Yoder, 2016). Protocols help to define the problem and provide 
procedures that act as a guide for achieving a desired outcome. Protocols also provide the 
specific guidelines for the use of decision-making frameworks that promote consistent 
and rational decisions from all members of the organization. Thus, applicable rules and 
regulations help the contracting officer in determining the best means and methods for 
fulfilling customer requirements. Specific command policies, memorandums, regulatory 
guidance, and other publications further refine the rules and other contracting procedures 
that encourage the standardization of systems and processes. These regulations serve to 
support, manage, and track the contracting process throughout the entire organization and 
the acquisition phases. 
Statutory requirements implemented through the FAR serve as the primary source 
of protocols for contracting professionals. Under FAR Part 14.202-8, Electronic Bids, the 
contracting officer has discretion in authorizing the use of electronic commerce to solicit 
bids, and in selecting the appropriate “electronic commerce method(s),” which includes 
the use of RAs. FAR Part 6 - Competition Requirements, FAR Part 8 - Required Sources 
of Supplies and Services, FAR Part 12 - Acquisition of Commercial Items, FAR Part 13 - 
Simplified Acquisition Procedures, and FAR Part 19 - Small Business Programs are 
several FAR parts that also affect RAs. Each of these FAR parts provides the contracting 
officer with options for selecting a solicitation method and evaluation criteria that 
provides the government with best value.  
Through policy memorandums, commands influence and manage employee 
behavior, reducing variance and individual discretion. The choice to enact policy 
memorandums are the product of an organization’s decision-making framework. Leaders 
seek to focus the direction of their organizations to perform consistently and uniformly as 
opposed to individuals working autonomously. The result is CPMs and other guidance 
designed to promote certain objectives such as process improvements, efficiencies, and 
organizational goals.  
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C. ANALYSIS  
As stated prior, every organization’s operational success depends upon its ability 
to properly manage and use its personnel, platforms, and protocols. The purpose of this 
section is to examine whether the Army is using RAs in the most effective and efficient 
manner to realize true cost savings. 
1. Personnel 
The ACC contains a well-trained and educated force of acquisition professionals. 
Personnel interviewed within the ACC were practitioners of RAs and SMEs on the use of 
RAs; their years of contracting experience well exceeded that of their DAWIA 
accreditation level. Many of the interviewees were highly credentialed with numerous 
years of contracting experience. On average, personnel interviewed had over 12 years of 
contracting experience. All interviewees held an active warrant ranging from the current 
SAT of $150,000 to an unlimited amount. Furthermore, only one interviewee was 
DAWIA Level II certified, with all remaining personnel being DAWIA Level III certified 
in contracting. 
Surprisingly, none of the personnel interviewed had completed any functional 
training on RAs despite being exceptionally qualified. When asked about training, several 
interviewees stated FedBid had provided their organization with formal training, but the 
briefings from FedBid mainly focused on account set-up with only a brief overview of 
the platform. DAU does offer a continuous learning course (CLC), CLC 031—Reverse 
Auctioning, with the following course description:  
Reverse Auctioning is a self-paced module that provides a basic 
introduction of a new, Internet-based contracting technique that is used by 
the DOD acquisition community to achieve significant cost savings 
through the use of e-commerce capabilities. The course is intended for 
entry- and middle-level acquisition managers who might use the Internet-
based technique in their daily business environments. (DAU, 2014) 
CLC 031 is listed as “desired training” under the Core Plus Development Guide for 
DAWIA Level II certification, but it is not mandated functional training per the core 
certification standards.  
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 DAU offers CLC 031, Reverse Auctioning, as functional training 
for contracting personnel. However, none of the interviewees had 
completed any formal functional training. 
 Most received training provided by FedBid that focused mainly 
on account set-up and only provided a brief overview of the RA 
platform. 
 None experienced any training on the use of the GSA or CHESS 
RA tools. 
Education  Interviewees were well-educated holding a bachelor’s degree or 
higher and maintained the requisite 24 semester business hours 
required for DAWIA certification.  
Experience  Personnel interviewed ranged in experience levels. Years of 
experience varied from seven years to 20+ years of contracting 




 Only one interviewee was DAWIA Level II certified, remaining 
interviewees were all DAWIA Level III certified in contracting. 
 
2. Platforms 
FedBid consistently received positive feedback in areas such as customer service 
and ease of use. Many interviewees noted the process efficiencies gained through the 
time savings enabled by the use of RAs and FedBid in particular. The use of these web-
based software systems can provide users with the ability to reduce solicitation and 
acquisition timelines. Through FedBid’s RA platform, contracting personnel can easily 
clone purchases when conducting multiple buys and operating under time constraints. 
This feature enables the purchase of multiple requirements within a condensed timeline 
and is especially useful during the end of the fiscal year and other peak seasons.  
Unfortunately, not all interviewees agreed that RAs and the FedBid platform 
generated significant time savings. Other users noted that the use of FedBid requires 
double-work since personnel must build the solicitation for the RA platform for bidding 
and again within PD2/SPS for contract award. Program Executive Office Enterprise 
Information Systems (PEO EIS) is in the process of developing the Army Contract 
Writing System (ACWS) as a replacement for SPS/PD2. The ACWS encompasses and 
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affects approximately 8,000 users in 280 sites worldwide (Army Contract Writing System 
[ACWS], 2016, para. 2). One of the objectives of ACWS is to reduce “the number of 
complex interfaces while fostering audit readiness” (ACWS, 2016, para. 1). Currently, 
none of the RA platforms directly interfaces with SPS/PD2. The result is that contracting 
officers and specialists must build all the contract terms, conditions, requirements, and 
clauses within FedBid, GSA, or CHESS for solicitation/bidding and then again within 
SPS/PD2 for contract award. 
Table 4.   Discussion of Results for Platforms 
Platforms 
SPS/PD2  Currently, the Army’s contract writing system (SPS/PD2) is not 
directly integrated with any RA platform. Contracting specialists and 
contracting officers must complete double-work by building the 
solicitation and the line item descriptions once into their RA platform 
for solicitation and then again into their contract writing system for 
award. 
 The future ACWS may include a RA feature in its effort to streamline 
and consolidate interfaces (M. Meinert, personal communication, July 
15, 2016). 
GSA  GSA’s RA platform provides contracting officers with a viable 
alternative to the use of FedBid, but only includes access to the GSA 
schedule holder community.  
 Launched in 2013, GSA’s RA platform has saved users more $18.5 
million with small businesses receiving 92% of all contract awards 
(Koehler, 2011, para 1). 
 In June 2016, GSA announced RA 2.0, which is its latest platform 
with additional and enhanced features based off initial reviews and 
feedback from users (Koehler, 2011, para 2). Interviewees agreed 
saying that the GSA platform was “not as user friendly as they hoped 
it would be, so they are taking their lessons learned and redoing it” 
(Interviewee #3, personnel communication, May 13, 2016).9  
FedBid, 
Inc. 
 Interviewees noted several advantages in the use of FedBid including 
ease of use, superior customer service, and time savings. Time savings 
is a particularly important advantage during peak seasons such as the 
end of the fiscal year when workload requirements typically increase. 
 Requires double-work; solicitation must be built within FedBid online 
web interface and again within PD2.    
 Several interviewees described the cloning option within FedBid as an 
                                                 
9 Communicated by interviewee #3 on May 13, 2016, at 0710 PST during a telephone interview. 
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Platforms 
important feature that provided valuable time savings. Users can clone 
and post similar buys for bidding without having to re-create 
requirements.  
 FedBid also enables contracting personnel to transfer buys among 
users balancing workloads when necessary and improving process 
efficiencies within organizations. 
 Interviewees also noted that FedBid provided superior customer 
service. Representatives were easily accessible and physically on-site 
during peak seasons. FedBid personnel were responsive, actively 
involved in agency buys, and easily accessible. 
 Centralized seller markets with additional options and access to 
multiple seller communities that include both GSA and CHESS.  
CHESS  Limited experience with the use of CHESS RAs.  
 No quantitative or qualitative data available. 
 Not user friendly. 
 No experience interacting with customer service representatives. 
 
3. Protocols 
RA users adhere to the guidance outlined in FAR Part 4.502(a) that states, “The 
Federal Government shall use electronic commerce whenever practicable or cost-
effective.” Thus, the FAR specifically encourages the use of electronic commerce and 
provides agencies with the discretion for implementing its use. Under FAR Part 1.102(d), 
the responsibility of determining applicability remains with every member of the 
acquisition team to “exercise personal initiative and sound business judgment in 
providing the best value product or service to meet the customer’s needs.” This type of 
language indicates that the contracting officer has personal discretion in determining the 
means and method to fulfill requirements exercising personal business acumen. This 
includes determining methods for the solicitation and award of contracts. Specifically, 
FAR 13.106-1(c)(2) outlines procedures for soliciting competition orally up to $25,000. 
However, organizations may also implement additional acquisition regulations that 
supplement the FAR. 
Consequently, the major commands within the ACC maintain their own CPMs 
regarding certain acquisition policies. The ACC Centers, the MICC, and DASA(P) all 
have published guidance on the use of RAs. Each policy differs in its approach, with 
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MICC policy being the most prescriptive, mandating the use of RAs for specified product 
and service codes regardless of dollar amounts. MICC CPM 12-15 requires that 
contracting officers receive a waiver approved by the director of the organization for 
procurements that deviate from the policy and the use of RAs. Hence, contracting officers 
within the MICC must utilize RAs for procurements under $25,000 instead of retaining 
the option to solicit oral quotes.10 MICC protocols also outline an annual goal to “utilize 
RAs for at least 25% of simplified acquisition purchases” (Vollmecke, 2012, para. 4).  
The ACC’s policy, CPM 13-20, Use of Reverse Auctioning, articulates similar 
goals but fails to mandate the use of RAs. It describes RAs as a mechanism for achieving 
“acquisition savings, increased competition, and results in a significant number of 
contract awards to small businesses” (Nichols, 2013, para. 2). It also states that RAs are 
best suited for procurements of simple supplies and services. The ACC sets a goal to 
utilize RAs in 25% of procurements for fixed-price supplies and commercial services 
between $15,000 and $150,000 within CONUS. For CONUS contractual actions in 
excess of $150,000, but less than $6.5 million, the ACC sets the RA goal at 10% 
(Nichols, 2013, para.5). 
Similarly, DASA(P) encourages the use of RA for simple supplies stating that 
reverse auctioning is most “successful in the areas of information technology, materials, 
and common supplies” (Bass, 2013, para. 1). DASA(P) further states that contracting 
officers should consider the use of RAs in solicitations for FFP commercial items and 
commodities. However, DASA(P) differs from both the ACC and MICC since DASA(P) 
is the only policy that specifically identifies and encourages the use of FedBid as a 
commercial provider of RA services. In addition, DASA(P) policy is the only policy that 
specifically identifies and encourages the completion of functional RA training available 
through DAU. 
                                                 
10 During telephonic interview #3 on May 13, 2016, at 0710 PST, the subject participant mentioned 
the restrictive nature of the MICC’s current RA policy, highlighting that the FAR allows contracting 
officers the ability to solicit orally for requirements with estimated dollar amounts up to $25,000. However, 
MICC policy supersedes the procedures outlined in the FAR requiring contracting officers and specialists 
to utilize RAs for mandated product and services codes regardless of estimated dollar amounts. 
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Table 5.   Discussion of Results for Protocols 
Protocols 
FAR   The main purpose of the FAR is to implement acquisition policies 
and statutory guidance. It serves as the primary publication and 
guiding document for Army contracting officers. 
 In 1997, amendments to the FAR enabled the use of e-commerce 
(FAR Part 4.5), paving the way for the implementation of online 
procurement tools like RAs. 
 Being less prescriptive in nature than MICC policy, the FAR 




 In accordance with CPM 13-20, “ACC is targeting high volume, 
recurring supply and commercial services procurement as the focus 
for its RA implementation” (Nichols, 2013, para 4). 
 ACC’s CPM establishes goals for the usage of RAs. For CONUS 
buys, the goal is 25% for procurements valued between $15,000 
and $150,000 and 10% for buys valued between $150,000 and $6.5 
million (Nichols, 2013, para 5). 
 Provides greater discretion to the contracting officer by not 
mandating the use of RAs for particular product and service codes. 
MICC  Within ACC, the MICC is the biggest user of RAs due to its 
command policy. Because of its increased use, the MICC also 
achieves the greatest amount of hard dollar cost savings. 
 Unlike the ACC Centers, MICC policy mandates RA use based on 
designated product and service codes. If contracting officers desire 
to deviate from MICC’s RA policy, then the field director, chief of 
contracting (CoC), Contracting Support Brigade (CSB) 
commander, or other commanding officer must approve a waiver.  
 Since MICC policy designates the use of RAs based off product 
and service codes, it fails to establish dollar thresholds and goals 
similar to the ACC Centers. Thus, regardless of anticipated dollar 
amount, the MICC utilizes RAs for the product and service codes 
listed in its policy. This means that procurements could range from 
the current micro-purchase threshold of $3,500 to millions of 
dollars. 
 However, MICC policy is to utilize RAs for a minimum of 25% of 
all SAP buys. Vollmecke (2012) encouraged greater use of RAs 
when practicable. 
DASA(P)  Attempts to standardize “Army-wide policy and procedures for 
utilizing reverse auctions for Army procurements” (Bass, 2013, 
para. 1). 
 Identifies FedBid as the Army’s commercial provider for RA 
services and encourages agencies to utilize FedBid for conducting 
RAs. 
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 References DAU functional training, CLC031—Reverse 
Auctioning, and encourages contracting personnel to complete the 
training. 
 
D. SUMMARY  
This chapter discussed the TIPS model in detail outlining personnel, platforms, 
and protocol and their application to the contracting workforce and RAs. We focused our 
examination on assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of ACC’s use of RAs through 
interviews with SMEs and by analyzing current contracting policy. The next chapter 
presents the final analysis, conclusions, recommendations, and areas for further research.   
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this MBA project was to investigate the following research 
questions. 
1. Primary Research Question 
 Is the Army using RAs in the most effective and efficient manner, or are 
there opportunities for expansion and/or improvement?  
To answer the primary research question, we conducted interviews with 
practitioners and SMEs of RAs within the ACC. Interview questions centered on the 
three pillars for integrative success identified as personnel, platforms, and protocols. For 
the purposes of this project, the researchers also defined effectiveness as “adequate to 
accomplish a purpose and producing the intended or expected result,” and efficiency as 
“the ability to accomplish a task with the least waste in terms of time, resources, effort, 
and competency in performance.” 
2. Secondary Research Questions  
 What theories govern the use of RA within the Army?  
 What are the current rules and regulations governing the use of RAs in the 
Army? What are the Army’s past experiences in using RAs? 
 What platforms has the Army used in the past for conducting RAs, and 
what platforms is it currently utilizing?  
 Is the Army generating the desired cost savings through its policy on the 
use of RA? 
For the secondary research questions, we used interview results and performed a 
literature review that examined economic principles such as auction theory, pricing 
strategies, and the pricing environment. We also explored the concept of competition and 
its effects on the marketplace. Interview questions strove to identify current processes, 
RA platforms, and results (cost savings) achieved with RAs. Interview and research 
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results helped to formulate the Army’s history in regard to its RA use, current processes 
and policy, and recommendations for the future.  
B.  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
1. Personnel 
Personnel interviewed were all DAWIA Level II– or III–certified, generally 
working as contracting officers within the ACC. Study participants included both military 
and civilian personnel, and interviewee positions included active contracting officers, 
procurement analysts, team leads, branch chiefs, and division chiefs. Consequently, 
personnel interviewed within the ACC were properly credentialed and in the right 
positions to maximize the use of RAs. All ACC interviewees held active warrants ranging 
from $150,000 to an unlimited amount. Many serve in leadership positions with years of 
contracting experience and institutional knowledge on the ACC’s use of RAs. Thus, 
personnel that participated in the study were highly credentialed with several years of 
contracting experience.  
2. Protocols  
A common theme was present in our analysis of cost savings. The contracting 
command in the ACC with the largest use of RAs, the MICC, also achieved the greatest 
“hard-dollar” cost savings. In his article, “Procuring Dollar and Time Savings: A Case 
Study of the Implementation of Reverse Auctions in the Federal Government,” Wyld 
reaches a similar conclusion, asserting that “the more procurements that are competed 
through the online marketplace, the greater the savings will be for the agency, the 
government as a whole, and most importantly, for the taxpayer” (Wyld, 2010, p. 18).  
Currently, only the MICC mandates the use of RAs for specified product and 
service codes previously determined to be the best candidates for RAs. Despite the recent 
emphasis from OFPP’s 2015 memorandum, Effective Use of Reverse Auctions, the ACC 
has not updated its RA policy since 2013. For FY2015, the ACC completed 2,409 RAs 
through FedBid’s online marketplace. Of the total FY2015 RAs, the MICC executed 
1,997 buys, the ACC Centers executed 339 buys, and the ECC executed 79 buys (J. 
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Staggs, personal communication, July 1, 2016). Without the emphasis of a prescriptive 
command policy, organizations fail to utilize RAs to the maximum extent, yielding less 
than optimal cost savings. In order to maximize savings, it will be necessary to increase 
efforts and the utilization of RA platforms implemented through the application of policy. 
3. Platforms 
FedBid’s online marketplace is the most utilized RA tool within the ACC. FedBid 
provides a fully serviced RA marketplace with outstanding customer support and a user-
friendly interface. With each use of its platform, FedBid assesses a 3% transaction fee 
and adds its fee to the winning vendor’s bid. The transaction fee is for the use of the RA 
service, and FedBid applies its fee regardless of whether the buy generates any cost 
savings. Upon request of the contracting professional conducting the RA, FedBid will 
waive a portion, or its entire fee, for buys that exceed target prices. ACC’s current 
contract with FedBid expires on September 30, 2017, and the ACC will need to re-
compete its requirement for RA services at that time. 
GSA and CHESS also provide RA platforms, but contracting officers and 
specialists within the ACC utilize these RA tools significantly less. Initially, the Army 
fielded its VCE-RA tool, but it is now obsolete due to lack of use, despite the license for 
the software being significantly lower in cost when compared to FedBid. However, GSA, 
CHESS, and VCE-RA were not fully serviced RA marketplaces. One of the biggest 
advantages with FedBid is that it significantly reduces “touch time” for contracting 
professionals. The significant reduction in processing time means that contracting officers 
can re-purpose their efforts and address higher-level tasks that are more complex in nature.  
Currently, the SPS/PD2 is the Army’s contract writing system. PEO EIS is in the 
process of developing the ACWS as a replacement to SPS/PD2. The current RA platforms 
utilized by the Army cannot directly interface with ACC’s contract writing system. The new 
ACWS intends to have an RA module where users will have the ability to conduct RAs 
within the new system. However, it is still uncertain as to the features and RA type that will 
be included within ACWS (M. Meinert, personal communication, July 25, 2016).11  
                                                 
11 Interview conducted telephonically on July 25, 2016, at 10:40 PST. 
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C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
If the ACC is to utilize RAs in the most effective and efficient manner, it is 
essential to select the appropriate RA type, field the best platform, and implement the 
correct protocols to maximize the use of RAs. These three factors together will yield 
maximum savings while generating new process improvements that will enable the ACC 
to become a more efficient and lean organization.  
1. Finding and Recommendation 1 
The ACC completed 368 RAs from August 8, 2015, through February 19, 2016, 
using FedBid’s online RA platform and marketplace (J. Staggs, personal communication, 
April 20, 2016).12 Open market buys represented almost 70% of total auctions, meaning 
there was no set-aside restrictions. Thirty-seven percent of RAs conducted during this 
time had no reported cost savings, and 46% had no cost savings over $12. On 71.4% of 
occurrences, FedBid assessed a fee on buys with cost saving of $12 or less, resulting in 
fees totaling over $139,000.  Consequently, FedBid applies fees on buys that achieve zero 
cost savings and, many times, only waives fees to an extent not to exceed target prices. In 
addition, when fees exceed target prices, FedBid only waives its fee at the request of the 
contracting officer. However, FedBid is not responsible for the results of the auction, but 
only accountable for providing RA services, which includes the online marketplace, 
platform, and customer support.  
The Army’s current contract with FedBid expires on September 30, 2017. 
Recommend that the Army solicit its follow-on requirement for RA services with fees 
based on a percentage of savings achieved through the auction or a flat fee for the use of 
the platform. For example, the contractor would earn the full fee on RAs that result in 
savings of 10% or greater. As the percentage of savings decreases, the fee earned also 
decreases. For flat fees, the contract would simply be a FFP contract with the Army 
paying a flat fee for services rather than a variable fee based on total dollars spent within 
                                                 
12 Personal communication with Jennifer Staggs, ACC procurement analyst, via email correspondence 
containing an excel spreadsheet of all ACC’s RAs completed from August 8, 2015 through February 19 
2016. 
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the platform. Of course, this recommendation assumes that the Army intends to re-
compete and award a follow-on contract for a fully managed RA marketplace.  
2. Finding and Recommendation 2 
Three RA types include the fully managed RA marketplace, the event-based 
software RA, and the self-service RA. Each type presents a continuum of services and 
options tailored to meet agency needs. The Army previously explored the use of 
alternative RA types resulting in the development of its VCE-RA tool. However, VCE-
RA lacked the policy to support its use, and the tool is no longer in use by ACC. The 
fully managed marketplace currently employed through the Army’s contract with FedBid 
enables the full suite of RA services. Unfortunately, FedBid online platform fails to 
interface directly with SPS/PD2.  
Recommend that the ACC conduct a cost–benefit analysis (CBA) and establish 
alternatives to a fully managed RA marketplace, including the development of its own 
platform compatible with the Army’s contract writing system. If the ACC is to maximize 
the benefits of RAs, it is critical to select or design the appropriate platform tailored to 
achieve organizational goals and objectives. Furthermore, the exploration of RA types 
and platforms could reveal the possibility for expanding the use of RAs into 
procurements that are more complex and beyond the acquisition for simple supplies and 
services. Effectively streamlining processes and generating hard savings means exploring 
the possibilities for different reverse auction types and platforms while implementing the 
policy to best support its use. 
3. Finding and Recommendation 3 
Within the ACC, the MICC is easily the largest user of RAs, having executed 
approximately 83% of ACC’s total RA buys for FY2015 (J. Staggs, personal 
communication, July 1, 2016). It is logical to assume that the MICC is the biggest buyer 
of recurring commodities, simple services, and other procurements that serve as the best 
candidates for RAs due primarily to the nature of its mission and its supported customers. 
Although the MICC certainly contracts for large, complex buys, it purchases a larger 
amount of requirements necessary for base operations support (BOS) when compared to 
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the ACC Centers and the ECC. Consequently, larger portions of MICC procurements are 
better suited for RAs when compared to its ECC and ACC counterparts. However, 
MICC’s RA policy is also the most prescriptive and mainly responsible for its large 
volumes of RA purchases. As Wyld (2010) states, greater quantities and amounts of RA 
buys also generate greater savings for the agency, the government, and ultimately the 
taxpayer. 
Recommend that the ACC implement policy mandating the use of RAs for 
specified product and service codes on procurements greater than $25,000. This 
recommendation updates ACC Center policy and slightly amends MICC’s current policy 
by enabling contracting officers to solicit orally for procurements up to $25,000 in 
accordance with FAR protocols. Contracting officers with established sources of supply 
are now empowered to leverage relationships and their business acumen to achieve 
maximum cost savings. Soliciting orally for small purchases also reduces the 
administrative burden on contracting officers, required by some agencies’ procedures, to 
review draft buys before contracting specialists post their requirements to FedBid. It also 
relieves the contract specialist of doing “double-work” by building the buy once within 
FedBid for solicitation and again within SPS/PD2 for contract award. 
4. Finding and Recommendation 4 
Clear policy and instruction are the keys to the effective employment of RAs. The 
MICC has leveraged the value of RAs to increase procurement savings and 
organizational efficiency through its policy. The existing MICC policy mandates the use 
of RA for specific product and service codes selected because of market research that 
identified those areas as being best suited for RAs (J. Staggs, personal communication, 
July 1, 2016).13 The prescriptive nature of MICC’s current policy is responsible for its 
increased use and additional savings.  
                                                 
13 Information provided via email correspondence on July 1, 2016. Interview questions discussed 
background information pertinent to ACC. 
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Data supports that RAs generate significant savings and process efficiencies. 
Recommend the ACC update its market research on RAs seeking to expand the use of 
RAs to additional product and service codes.  
D. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
Areas of further research will add additional value to the existing findings and 
recommendations outlined in this research report. Proposals for further research focus on 
competition, small business concerns, and inherently government functions as related to 
RAs.     
1. Adequate Competition and the Reverse Auction Marketplace 
Additional research is necessary to determine the amount of actual competition 
experienced during each RA and its effects on hard dollar cost savings. The RA platform 
leverages competition to decrease price to generate maximum cost savings, but in 
FY2012, the GAO reported that over one-third of RAs had no competition to drive down 
prices (GAO, 2013, p. i). What are the effects of the number of bids and bids received on 
cost savings achieved during RAs? Is there a correlation? How are the benefits and 
efficiencies gained through the use RAs diminished when there is not adequate 
competition?   
2. The Effects of RAs on Small Businesses 
Future research is necessary to determine the effects of RAs on small businesses. 
Research conducted by Wyld witnessed an increase in the volume of dollars awarded to 
small business through RAs from FY2011 through FY2015. Do RAs benefit small 
businesses? How do small businesses compare against their larger, better-established 
counterparts when competing for federal contracts through RAs? Can federal agencies 
use RAs to achieve their SB utilization goals?   
3. Inherently Governmental Functions and Reverse Auctions 
As the federal government continues to outsource critical organizational 
functions, it is necessary to monitor the Army’s reliance on third-party contractors like 
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FedBid, which perform functions “closely associated” to inherently governmental. 
FedBid vets vendors into its marketplace and assists contracting professionals in drafting 
buys for RAs. Is the government outsourcing inherently governmental functions through 
its contract for RA services? Further analysis is necessary to address the implications of 
outsourcing RA services to third-party contractors and to determine the effects on the 
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